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Executive Summary 
1. This paper explores the “experimentalist turn” in governance studies and aims to 
assess its implications for inter-governmental relations in the multi-level polity on the one 
hand and for the place-based approach to innovation and territorial development on the 
other. Beginning with a conceptual discussion of experimentalist governance as developed 
by pragmatist scholars like Charles Sabel, the paper branches out to explore a range of 
experimentalist initiatives at the national level, focusing first on state-led experiments in 
political systems like China and Russia, where experiments are conducted under 
bureaucratic hierarchy and political decree. By way of contrast, more bottom-up state-
sponsored experiments in liberal democratic systems are also explored and the paper 
addresses three prominent examples in the form of the New Industrial Policy paradigm, 
the Entrepreneurial State thesis and the Public Sector Innovation Lab.  
2. As experimental governance initiatives are most prominent at the sub-national 
level, the paper examines a range of place-based theories, covering well-known territorial 
concepts, such as regional innovation systems, city-regionalism and new localism, as well 
as more novel concepts such as foundational economy, universal basic services and 
constitutional political economy. Whatever their differences, all these place-based 
perspectives concur with the new conventional wisdom that the quality of institutions is of 
paramount importance for all types of places – for leading cities and regions that are 
striving to maintain their dynamism and for lagging cities and regions that aspire to 
become something other than they are today by tackling what the Barca Report called “the 
persistent underutilization of potential”.  
3. To underscore the significance of effective and democratic governance, the final 
section explores the scope for empowering sub-national spaces by examining two 
important perspectives on place-based deliberative capacity, namely the post-functionalist 
governance thesis, which offers a new conception of regional authority and territorial 
belonging, and the deepening democracy perspective. The former is helpful because it 
situates the issues of regional authority and territorial identity in a multi-level governance 
framework, while the latter raises issues about local deliberative capacity and active 
citizenship in the context of asymmetrical power relations.  
4. Urban and regional development is assuming more political importance at a time 
when territorial inequalities are fuelling polarised politics and nativist sentiments. 
Experimental governance initiatives can play an important role in a territorial repertoire 
that fosters rather than frustrates inclusive and sustainable forms of place-based 
development.  
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1.  Introduction 
5. The governance arrangements through which societies choose to manage their 
collective affairs are being challenged like never before. One of the key challenges is how 
to manage the competing claims of democracy, deliberation and devolution, what we 
might call the governance trilemma. How, in other words, should societies meet the 
demands of an increasingly polarised democracy; to what extent should citizens be 
allowed to deliberate in matters of everyday life beyond the ballot box; and what is the 
appropriate balance between centralising power in the name of solidarity and devolving 
power for the sake of subsidiarity? While these governance arrangements are intrinsically 
significant issues, ends in themselves so to speak, they also have an instrumental 
significance in the sense that they are the means to an end because they furnish the 
institutional structures and networks through which our models of development are framed 
and fashioned.   
6. In territorial development circles for example, one of the most intensely debated 
issues during the past 20 years has been the quality of governance at all levels of the 
multilevel polity – in supra-national institutions, national governments and at the sub-
national level of cities and regions. A growing body of evidence suggests that the quality 
of institutions matters – not merely for the sake of economic growth but also for health, 
well-being, poverty reduction and the fight against corruption (EC, 2014; Pike et al, 2006). 
The quality of institutions is also an essential element in the repertoire of place-based 
policies to reduce territorial inequalities between leading and lagging areas. Uneven 
territorial development is attracting more and more political attention across OECD 
countries as it is widely believed to be fuelling the growth of noxious populist sentiments; 
so much so that even mainstream political commentators are warning that “the widening 
urban-rural divide suggests that the most explosive political pressures may now lie within 
countries – rather than between them” (Rachman, 2018).  
7. One of the responses to these challenges has been a growing readiness to 
experiment with new governance arrangements and new models of development and the 
aim of this paper is to explore some of these experiments in the following way. Section 2 
sets the theoretical scene by exploring what I call the “experimentalist turn” in governance 
studies. It offers a definition of experimental governance (EG) and explains why it has 
emerged as such an influential theme in the domains of theory, policy and practice. 
Beginning with a discussion of EG as originally developed by Charles Sabel and 
colleagues, the section broadens the frame of reference to assess the significance of EG for 
our understanding of multi-level governance issues like asymmetric decentralisation on 
the one hand and territorial development on the other. 
8. The following sections adopt a more capacious and less restrictive view of EG by 
examining experimental governance at the national level, focusing on a range of state-
sponsored experimentalist activities. Section 3 focuses on the top-down, state-driven 
experimentalist models that have characterised China and Russia. By way of contrast, 
section 4 explores the bottom-up experimentalist models that have featured prominently in 
liberal capitalist countries in recent years, namely: (i) the New Industrial Policy paradigm; 
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(ii) the Entrepreneurial State thesis and (iii) the hybrid models of Public Sector Innovation 
Labs championed by the likes of NESTA. 
9. Section 5 shifts the focus from the national to the sub-national scale and addresses 
the territorial development literature by considering some prominent place-based theories 
of change, ranging from well-established theories (like regional innovation systems, city-
regionalism and new localism) to new theories that offer a radically different perspective 
on place-based innovation (like the foundational economy, universal basic services and 
constitutional political economy).  Each of these theories contains its own place-based 
narrative about the interplay between governance and development and the aim of this 
exercise is to discover what – if anything – they add to our understanding of experimental 
governance.  
10. Section 6 moves from place-based development issues to place-based democratic 
issues because EG has been criticised for being somewhat insensitive to accountability 
and transparency as well as for under-estimating the abiding significance of hierarchy and 
power. To address these democratic and deliberative dimensions, this section explores the 
scope for empowering sub-national spaces by examining two important perspectives on 
place-based deliberative capacity, namely: (i) the post-functionalist governance thesis of 
Hooghe and Marks, which offers a new conception of regional authority and territorial 
belonging; and (ii) the deepening democracy perspective associated with the work of Fung 
and Wright. The former is helpful because it situates the issues of regional authority and 
territorial identity in a multi-level governance framework, while the latter raises issues 
about local deliberative capacity and active citizenship in the context of asymmetrical 
power relations.  
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2.  The experimentalist turn in governance 
The model of experimentalist governance developed by Charles Sabel et al was originally 
conceived as a response to the perceived failure of “command and control” governance 
mechanisms, a process that obliged front line actors to find joint solutions to common 
problems through experimental trial and error processes. Section 2 focuses on two key 
aspects of the model – namely the capacity for learning-by-monitoring in public sector 
bodies and the degree of autonomy and discretion afforded to local units in the multilevel 
polity – before branching out to consider applications of the model, firstly with respect to 
asymmetrical decentralisation, a new form of devolution in the multilevel polity and, 
secondly, with respect to the place-based approach to territorial development.  
11. The governance literature has grown exponentially over the past two decades 
largely in response to the systemic changes wrought in states, markets and networks as 
firms and governments have sought to avail themselves of the opportunities and insure 
themselves against the vicissitudes of burgeoning globalisation and accelerating 
technological change. Impossible as it is to do justice to the nuances of this vast literature, 
the most important point to establish is that there are radically different interpretations of 
what these changes imply for the way we understand the nature and role of “the state” and 
its manifold relationships with economy and society. At one end of the spectrum we have 
the “governing without government” school of thought and its derivatives, which argue 
that government/state is now simply one among many actors in a broadly diffused system 
of “self-organizing, inter-organisational networks”, a perspective that downgrades the 
status of government/state as the latter becomes progressively hollowed-out (Rhodes, 
1996). At the other end of the spectrum there is the state-centric perspective that maintains 
that, far from being hollowed out, the state remains a central actor in the governance 
system of all countries even if its modus operandi have changed (Bell and Hindmoor, 
2009).    
12. Whatever the differences in interpretation, all governance theories seem to concur 
that the changes that have been wrought in advanced economies since the 1980s signal a 
growing inclination on the part of governments at all levels of the multilevel polity – 
national, regional and local – to experiment with new ways of working internally and new 
modes of interacting with their external interlocutors in the private and civic sectors. 
Democratic experimentalism is the most distinctive and compelling of these new 
governance theories and therefore we consider it first.  
2.1. Democratic experimentalism: a pragmatist conception  
13. Contemporary debates about experimentalist governance (EG) are closely 
associated with the seminal work of Charles Sabel (professor of law and social science at 
Columbia Law School) who has applied the concept to a wide range of issues, including 
place-based development in multi-level governance systems, social welfare reform and 
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transnational regulatory agreements with respect to food safety, global supply chains and 
common pool resources (Sabel, 1994; 2005; 2012; Sabel and Simon, 2011; Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2012; Dorf and Sabel, 1998).  Philosophically, Sabel is a pragmatist in the 
American tradition of John Dewey (1859-1952) and the latter was one of the main 
inspirations for the concept of democratic experimentalism, the great merit of which is its 
capacity for learning and adaptation via robust inquiry and evidence. 
14. In The Public and its Problems (1927) Dewey was primarily concerned to restate 
the case for democracy in the face of elitist arguments that claimed that society had 
become too complex to be governed by “the public”, the notion of which was dismissed as 
a phantom, and that it was time to acknowledge that only technical experts had the 
requisite knowledge to govern (Lippmann, 1925). Part of Dewey’s response was to 
propose a democratic method of inquiry in which all policies and proposals for reform 
would be treated as no more than working hypotheses. “They will be experimental”, 
Dewey wrote, “in the sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-
equipped observation of the consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to 
ready and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences...Differences of opinion 
in the sense of differences of judgement as to the course which it is best to follow, the 
policy which it is best to try out, will still exist. But opinion in the sense of beliefs formed 
and held in the absence of evidence will be reduced in quantity and importance. No longer 
will views generated in view of special situations be frozen into absolute standards and 
masquerade as eternal truths” (Dewey, 1927: 203).   
15. Deeply exercised by the asymmetrical relationship between experts and a 
democratic public, Dewey thought no government by experts could be anything other than 
“an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few” if there was no opportunity for citizens 
to express their needs. What was needed, he argued, was “the improvement of the methods 
and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public” 
(Dewey, 1927: 208). He portrayed this relationship between experts and the public 
through a simple analogy that perfectly illustrated the different (but equally important) 
types of practical and technical knowledge that each side possessed by saying that the man 
who wears the shoe knows best where it pinches, “even if the expert shoemaker is the best 
judge of how the trouble is to be remedied” (Dewey, 1927: 207).  
16. To the consternation of posterity, however, Dewey had little or nothing to say 
about the form of institutional design, about how his democratic method of social inquiry 
and joint problem solving could be developed in and through concrete institutions. This is 
the intellectual vacuum that Sabel sought to fill when, in a penetrating essay on Dewey 
and Democracy, he outlined an ambitious new pragmatist agenda: “Democratic 
experimentalism addresses the problem of the design of pragmatist institutions and 
cognate problems of making and revising democratic decisions. The aim is not of course 
to try to say what Dewey might have or should have said, and still less to chide him for 
not saying it. Rather the goal is to make conceptually more cognizable and empirically 
more plausible a form of democracy, situated as today’s must be in the uncertain flux of 
experience, sharing Dewey’s aspiration of linking adaptive social learning and the greatest 
possible development of individuality, and assuming (from a combination of conviction 
and the assessment of experience) that these goals cannot be achieved by harnessing 
market mechanisms to the largest of public purposes” (Sabel, 2012: 37).  
17. Sabel’s concept of experimentalist governance (as democratic experimentalism 
came to be called) was developed as a response to the perceived failure of “command and 
control” regulation in a rapidly changing world where fixed rules written by a hierarchical 
authority are quickly rendered obsolete on the ground, where front line actors need to find 
  │ 9 
 
  
  
joint solutions to common problems through experimental trial and error processes. In its 
most developed form, experimentalist governance (EG) involves a multi-level architecture 
in which four elements are linked in an iterative cycle: (i) broad framework goals and 
metrics are provisionally established by central and local units; (ii) local units are given 
broad autonomy and discretion to pursue these goals in their own way; (iii) as a condition 
of this autonomy, local units must report regularly on their performance and participate in 
a peer review in which their results are compared to others who are using different means 
to the same ends; and (iv) the goals, metrics and decision-making procedures are revised 
by a widening circle of actors in response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the 
peer review process, and the cycle repeats. In short, EG can be defined as “a recursive 
process of provisional goal-setting based on learning from the comparison of alternative 
approaches to advancing them in different contexts” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 169).  
18. This model of EG is probably best described as intellectually compelling but 
politically challenging: compelling because it is predicated on a learning-by-monitoring 
methodology that is deliberative and evidence-based; but challenging too because public 
bodies, particularly public bodies in institutionally weak environments, may not have the 
capacity to rise to the EG challenge. As we will see later, some of the most challenging 
aspects of this model begin to emerge when we consider particular applications in 
concrete policy contexts – like the challenge of incorporating EG in the new regional 
innovation strategies and the challenge of practicing EG in marginalised communities and 
“left behind”. 
19. At the heart of this particular model is the claim that hierarchical management and 
principal-agent governance has been compromised by the advent of strategic uncertainty. 
The core of the argument runs as follows: one of the foundations of principal-agent 
governance is the monitoring of subordinate agents’ conformity to fixed rules and detailed 
instructions; but in a world where “principals” are uncertain of their goals and how best to 
achieve them, they must be prepared to learn from the problem-solving activities of their 
“agents”. As a result, “principals can no longer hold agents reliably accountable by 
comparing their performance against predetermined rules, since the more successful the 
latter are in developing new solutions, the more the rules themselves will change” (Sabel 
and Zeitlin, 2012: 175).  
20. To give a foretaste of these challenges let us focus on two key propositions of the 
EG model, namely: (i) the commitment to and capacity for learning-by-monitoring in 
public sector bodies and (ii) the degree of autonomy and discretion afforded to local units 
in the multilevel polity and the alleged demise of hierarchy.  
21. The first proposition involves two distinct but related questions – the commitment 
to learning-by-monitoring on the part of ruling politicians and their public sector managers 
and the organisation’s technical capacity for learning-by-monitoring. The commitment to 
learning about what works where and why has been questioned by researchers across a 
wide range of disciplines, not least because it assumes that learning is extolled by 
politicians and managers as an organisational goal when in fact it tends to be subordinated 
to a whole series of other goals, like the retention of power and status for example. In 
other words a commitment to learning and innovation needs to be empirically established 
rather than theoretically presumed because experience and evidence suggests that 
politicians and policymakers “are not primarily interested in truth, reflexivity, and “what 
works”. They primarily seek power, bureau expansion, popularity, reputation, and other 
goals. Knowledge can be used to gain legitimacy for ill-planned policy reforms or to 
justify prefabricated opinions. For this reason, learning may not be beneficial to politics 
and public policy-making” (Gilardi and Radaelli, 2012:165).  Furthermore, even where 
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there is a genuine political commitment to learning, it is by no means certain that the 
requisite technical capacity exists to realise the goal, one of the major barriers to learning 
in lagging regions as we’ll see later (Marques and Morgan, 2018).  
22. The second proposition, that local units are afforded sufficient autonomy and 
discretion to engage in local problem-solving activity, also needs to be empirically 
verified rather than presumed because, while the rhetoric of networked governance has 
certainly become de rigueur in both private and public sectors in recent years, the reality 
exposed in empirical surveys suggests that traditional hierarchies continue to loom large in 
the prosaic practices of organisations (Hill and Lynn, 2005).  Sabel et al. freely admit that 
their model of EG belongs to the “optimistic” side of the postmodern family of views in 
holding that the absence of a controlling hierarchy of authority creates the conditions 
under which “local changes can have local effects, and that these effects can percolate 
horizontally and even upwards” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012:180). Although this 
experimentalist model is designed to create space for local innovation – and it certainly 
makes a powerful case for the transformative potential of local action where autonomy 
and discretion have been delegated to front-line units – serious questions remain about 
how much real authority has been devolved to the local level and how far hierarchical 
structures have been superseded by networked forms of multilevel governance, 
particularly in the less developed cities and regions of centralised and unitary states 
(Marques and Morgan, 2018).  
23. Whatever its shortcomings the EG model proposed by Sabel et al. has provoked a 
lively debate in governance circles. In Europe the main criticisms have focused on fears 
that EG may harbour negative implications for traditional forms of representative 
democracy; that it tends to downplay the abiding significance of hierarchy; and that it fails 
to appreciate that learning outcomes are tilted towards pro-market policy paths on account 
of the structural biases inherent in the political architecture of the EU’s multi-level polity 
(for examples see Eckert and Borzel, 2012; Fossum, 2012). In the US some of the most 
strident criticisms have come from the social policy field, where democratic 
experimentalism is criticised because it allegedly assumes: consensus on the nature of 
problems; the propriety of government action; reliable metrics for measuring success; the 
luxury of time; the lack of situations requiring centralized policymaking; and the belief 
that deliberation is a relatively costless process. These assumptions, it is claimed, have not 
been met in anti-poverty law, where almost all progress has come not from decentralised 
local experimentation but, rather, from “centralized, non-participatory, and non-
experimentalist policymaking” (Super, 2008: 541). While all these criticisms need to be 
more fully debated, they should not detract from the fact that the model of EG proposed 
by Sabel constitutes an immensely compelling case for devolved problem-solving 
capacity. Furthermore, by making the case for post-bureaucratic pragmatist institutions, he 
has helped to fill the intellectual vacuum bequeathed by John Dewey. 
2.2. Asymmetrical decentralisation in the multilevel polity 
24. The growth of multilevel governance studies has been fuelled by the enormous 
changes in the territorial architecture of state systems and these changes can be understood 
in experimentalist terms if we take a looser and more capacious definition of EG rather 
than the highly specific model discussed above. Reforming the territorial architecture of a 
state is a highly fraught endeavour because it needs to strike a judicious balance between 
solidarity and subsidiarity, two equally important institutional design principles in liberal 
democracies. A state that neglects the former runs the risk of losing its social cohesion and 
territorial integrity; while the neglect of the latter poses a threat to diversity, creativity and 
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democracy, which could also jeopardise its territorial integrity. These territorial dilemmas 
are assuming more importance because of the growing trend towards asymmetric 
decentralisation (AD), where selected sub-national jurisdictions are treated differently to 
their territorial peers on economic, political or administrative grounds. AD carries costs 
and benefits. Potential benefits are linked to the fact that institutional and fiscal 
frameworks can be better aligned with local capacities and may be better attuned to local 
needs. A comprehensive study recently concluded by saying that “asymmetric 
decentralisation favours experimentation, learning-by-doing and innovation in policy-
making. Ultimately, it represents an advanced form of place-based policy” (OECD, 2018: 
34). As regards the potential costs, AD can exacerbate inter-regional inequalities and, in 
extreme cases, trigger secessionist demands and movements. From an experimentalist 
perspective, AD needs to be managed in a transparent manner in which the rationale for 
extra powers is clear and there is a quid pro quo as to what is expected in return, a 
deliberative and results-driven process between central and local units. 
25. AD is part of what has been called the “silent revolution” of decentralisation 
reforms that have been sweeping the globe since the 1980s (Ivanya and Shah, 2014). 
Because it is such a contentious topic, subject to so many claims and counter-claims 
between centralists and devolutionists, it is worth quoting a very sober review of the 
evidence which found that: “Decentralisation is not good or bad in itself. Its outcomes 
much depend on the way the process is designed and implemented, on adequate sub-
national capacity, and on the quality of multi-level governance. When it is properly 
conducted and balanced across policy areas, there is evidence that decentralisation may be 
conducive to growth. Beyond economic benefits, decentralisation might allow enhanced 
accountability, transparency and citizens’ engagement, thus improving democracy” 
(Allain-Dupre, 2018: 3).   
26. According to the OECD, decentralisation has been an important international trend 
in governance for more than seventy years and it remains high on the political agenda of 
many countries today (OECD, 2018).  While the degree of decentralisation is difficult to 
measure and compare, the OECD Fiscal databases and other relevant sources have shown 
that decentralisation is still on the rise in many countries. Data from the Regional 
Authority Index also show that 52 out of 81 countries experienced a net increase in 
decentralisation in the years 1950-2010 and only nine experienced a net decline (OECD, 
2018; Hooghe et al., 2016).   
27. As to the drivers of AD it has been shown that asymmetrical arrangements arise 
for at least three reasons: (i) political reasons to diffuse ethnic or regional tensions; (ii) 
efficiency reasons to achieve better macroeconomic management and administrative 
cohesion; and/or (iii) administrative reasons to enable subnational governments with 
differing capacities to exercise the full range of their functions and powers. The first type 
of asymmetry, political asymmetry, is clearly driven by non-economic concerns, while the 
latter are consistent with an administrative ‘top-down’ approach to decentralization (Bird 
and Ebel, 2007; OECD, 2018).  
28. The different forms of AD also merit attention because there has been a distinct 
shift over time from regional forms to metropolitan forms as cities assume more 
importance in economic narratives (as “engines of growth” etc.) and in terms of their 
political weight (given burgeoning urban populations). The most conspicuous examples of 
metropolitan asymmetry involve the larger cities in each country, like the following 
examples: 
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 In France the 2013 French Law on Metropolitan Areas provided for differentiated 
governance for Paris, Lyon and Aix-Marseille that included governance structures 
with their own taxing powers and entailed a shift of competences from regions and 
departments. To justify the spread of AD arrangements, the French government 
said that “uniformity is no longer the condition of our unity”; 
 in Italy a 2014 reform ended two decades of gridlock over territorial restructuring 
by creating a new legal structure for the introduction of differentiated governance 
in ten major metro areas—Rome, Turin, Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, 
Florence, Bari, Naples, and Reggio Calabria—and four additional cities in special 
regions—Palermo, Messina, and Catania in Sicily, as well as Cagliari in Sardinia;  
 in the UK the Core Cities have been the chief beneficiaries of a series of City 
Deals that devolved certain powers to city-regions in exchange for their agreement 
to meet certain economic goals and to be governed by directly-elected metro 
mayors (OECD, 2018; Allain-Dupre, 2018; Waite and Morgan, 2018). 
29. Beyond the large cities, AD arrangements have been introduced at the local 
municipal level as well. A prominent example being Denmark, where nine local 
municipalities were granted exemptions from government rules in order to test new ways 
of carrying out their service delivery tasks, in a policy experiment known as the Free 
Municipality initiative. The main focus to date has been on simplification, innovation, 
quality and a more inclusive approach to the individual citizen, with many of the 
experiments focusing on employment. The Free Municipality experiment is currently 
being evaluated, in order to form the basis for potential future legislation on de-
bureaucratization for all municipalities. The concept of Free Municipalities continues in 
an adjusted form until 2019, and is currently being extended to more municipalities 
(OECD 2017).  
30. For AD arrangements to work well there has to be sufficient capacity in the sub-
national jurisdiction that wishes to assume the new powers and functions. Aside from the 
obvious fiscal capacity issue, surveys frequently report the lack of key capacities – in 
terms of staff, skills, expertise, scale for example – to address complex issues such as 
strategic planning, procurement, infrastructure investment, performance monitoring, etc. 
For example, the OECD-CoR survey results of the 2015 survey on sub-national obstacles 
to investment showed that institutional capacities of SNGs vary enormously within 
countries, in all countries surveyed (OECD/CoR, 2015).  Given the emphasis on learning-
by-monitoring in the experimentalist model discussed in the preceding section, it is 
instructive to note that 66% of the respondents in this survey said that, while they 
possessed a monitoring system, it was simply an “administrative exercise and not used as 
a tool for planning and decision-making” (OECD/CoR, 2015: 14).  
31. Perhaps the most important question of all, however, concerns the impact of AD. 
The answer to this question will clearly depend on a whole series of related variables, such 
as the country context (unitary or federal state), the territorial form of AD (regional, 
metropolitan or municipal) and why it was introduced in the first place (political or 
administrative asymmetry). In the case of political asymmetry the ultimate test of any AD 
arrangement is whether it has helped to preserve the territorial integrity of the state, which 
would seem to be the case (at least to date) with respect to the Basque Country in Spain, 
Quebec Province in Canada and Scotland in the UK.   
32. Sweden’s AD experiments, which were initially focused on two “pilot regions” in 
Skåne and Västra Götaland, are also notable for two reasons: first, because they are good 
examples of bottom-up experimentation through voluntary county amalgamations; and, 
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second, because they allowed the new jurisdictions to achieve things that might not have 
happened without such scaling-up. For example, one of the most innovative developments 
in Skåne concerns the creation of a biogas cluster as a result of the regional authority 
helping to calibrate supply and demand. Local experts who analysed the formation of the 
cluster concluded by saying:  
“A decisive moment for the biogas industry in Scania was in 2007 when the 
regional government’s public transport committee set up a goal that all public 
transport in the region should be fossil free in 2020, with sub-goals targeting 
fossil free city traffic (city buses) in 2015, regional traffic in 2018 and remaining 
service trips in 2020. In reaction to the announcement of these goals, the company 
running the public transport in the region—being a publicly owned company and 
part of the regional authorities—thereupon took the decision to invest in biogas. 
Important for this decision was the fact that the energy needed for the public 
transport should be produced locally in order to obtain a direct environmental 
effect in the region. Biogas was regarded as the fuel with the highest regional 
potential; attributed also to the increasingly developing regional specialization in 
biogas” (Martin and Coenen, 2015:2019).  
33. This regional example demonstrates that while an AD arrangement might be 
introduced for administrative reasons – to secure economies of scale in service provision 
for example – it can deliver multiple benefits, in this case building regional institutional 
capacity that was able to deploy its powers (including public procurement power) to help 
calibrate supply and demand to fashion a new regional industrial cluster as well as deliver 
a more sustainable climate-friendly public transport system.  
34. The process of assessing the overall impact of AD arrangements needs to be an 
evidence-based exercise to demonstrate the costs and benefits in a transparent manner, a 
process that provides confirmation to other areas that the asymmetrical scheme is above 
board because, as a territorial experiment, AD carries risks and opportunities. On the 
positive side it can enable places that have the capacity – be they cities, regions or 
municipalities – to explore more inclusive and sustainable ways of promoting service 
delivery and area-based development. Some proponents of decentralized local governance 
even claim that it is “associated with higher human development, lower corruption, and 
higher growth” (Ivanyna and Shah, 2014).  On the negative side, however, the case against 
devolving decision-making is made with equal vigour by scholars who point to the 
"dangers of decentralization", such as macro instability, the threat to territorial equity and 
the potential for more corruption due to the greater propensity for clientelistic 
relationships (Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2007). Such polarised debates are best resolved in a 
Dewey-like fashion through rigorous inquiry and public debate informed by a robust 
evidence base, which is precisely what a recent OECD review recommended, saying:  
“Asymmetric decentralisation should be seen as an experiment. Therefore, there 
should be a system in place for the central government to evaluate the effects of 
asymmetric arrangements, at least as part of a more general evaluation of the 
services in question. A high quality impact evaluation enables informed policy 
changes which may be critical for successful implementation. The evaluation 
programs should be planned well ahead and in close cooperation with researchers 
and other experts of impact evaluation. A considerable effort should be put on 
spreading the good practices and the lessons learned from the asymmetric 
decentralisation policies” (OECD, 2018: 39). 
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35. To the extent that AD involves the devolution of power as opposed to the mere 
delegation of functions, it creates new challenges for the multilevel polity because 
devolving power does not mean (or should not mean) abdicating responsibility on the part 
of central government. Evidence and experience suggest that the vertical coordination of 
authority remains one of the most difficult policy challenges in a multilevel polity because 
surveys have found debilitating “coordination gaps” between national and sub-national 
governments, especially in unitary state systems (Charbit and Michalun, 2009; Allain-
Dupre, 2018). These vertical coordination gaps can seriously frustrate the mobilisation of 
investment and compromise the best-laid plans for territorial development.   
2.3. Experimentalism and the place-based approach 
36. To complement the foregoing analysis of inter-governmental experiments, this 
section explores the experimentalist approach to territorial development with respect to the 
place-based approach advocated in the Barca Report, An Agenda For A Reformed 
Cohesion Policy (Barca, 2009). Ten years on from the publication of the Barca Report, 
this section reflects on the experimentalist principles of the place-based approach in the 
light of a decade of experience. The Barca Report was a prodigious intellectual 
achievement based on an unprecedented process of engagement and debate involving a 
series of hearings with officials and academics and ten specially commissioned thematic 
reports. From an EG perspective the significance of the Barca Report is twofold. First, it 
was the first mainstream report on territorial development to formally acknowledge and 
fully embrace the core principles of democratic experimentalism. Second, it offered the 
most sophisticated intellectual justification for an integrated place-based approach to 
territorial development, signalling a decisive break with past forms of cohesion policy in 
the EU, many of which were essentially compensation payments for lagging regions.  
37. Re-stating the case for a place-based approach was an urgent task in the first 
decade of the new millennium, politically and intellectually, because many policymakers 
in OECD countries had become mesmerised by ideas associated with the so-called New 
Economic Geography, which among other things breathed new life into some very old 
neo-classical economic nostrums. Perhaps the most famous example of this new/old 
thinking was the 2009 World Bank Report, Reshaping Economic Geography, which 
championed a “spatially-blind” approach to development by recommending policies that 
are designed without any explicit reference to space because: “Explicitly spatial policies 
are not generally necessary. Universal or spatially blind institutions— made available to 
everyone regardless of location—form both the bedrock and the mainstay of an effective 
integration policy” (World Bank, 2009: 24). Notwithstanding its title, the World Bank 
report set aside the significance of geographical context with its binary emphasis on 
people not place, neglecting all the evidence in and beyond economic geography that 
showed that development was a place-dependent as well as a path-dependent process in 
which spatially targeted policies have been highly consequential for cities, regions and 
countries (Storper, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Rodrik, 2008).  Although it is barely a 
decade old, the World Bank vision quickly lost its lustre for policymakers because the 
place-based approach is now de rigueur in international policy circles. For its critics, on 
the other hand, the main problem with the World Bank analysis was that it was quite 
simply wrong, especially as regards the antediluvian notion that spatial inequalities would 
be tempered and reduced through the twin effects of labour mobility and trickle-down 
growth (for other critical assessments see Rodriguez-Pose, 2010; Barca et al, 2012).  
38. In contrast to the so-called “spatially-blind” approach (a highly erroneous term 
because policies that are allegedly non-spatial in principle are inevitably spatially uneven 
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in practice) the place-based approach is predicated on a number of fundamentally different 
propositions, two of which are highly pertinent to the experimentalist perspective. The 
first is that geographical context really matters, and context is understood here in the 
multidimensional sense to include social, cultural, political and institutional specificities. 
The second proposition is that knowledge and power also matter in the design and 
implementation of territorial policies: the role of multilevel governance is critically 
important here because no single level of government has sufficient knowledge to know 
what works where and why, hence the need for local knowledge to be elicited from local 
actors and for extra-local knowledge (and pressure) to be brought to bear if and when local 
elites are unable or unwilling to tackle the “persistent underutilization of potential” (Barca, 
2009: vii). 
39. In this multilevel architecture, as the Barca Report conceived it, the upper levels of 
government are supposed to set the general goals and the performance standards to 
establish and enforce the “rules of the game”, while the lower levels have “the freedom to 
advance the ends as they see fit” (Barca, 2009: 41). The ultimate purpose of exogenous 
intervention in this scenario is to induce local agents to commit their energy, knowledge 
and resources to tackling untapped potential in their territory. But what if they fail to do so 
by engaging instead in rent-seeking and gaming the system? The antidote to this danger, 
according to Barca, is to utilise the key principles of democratic experimentalism, namely 
to make the local decision-making process verifiable, open, experimental and inclusive. In 
other words to establish the following principles: 
 a clear identification of objectives and standards, measured by validated 
indicators, which can be compared with what happens elsewhere and which are 
open to monitoring and public debate; 
 a permanent mobilisation of all interested parties, stimulated by exogenous 
interventions, by the injection of information on actions and results; 
 an experimental approach through which collective local actors are given an 
opportunity to experiment with solutions while exercising mutual monitoring, and 
alternative measures are tried and compared through a systematic learning process, 
where the results are used to design new interventions (Barca, 2009: 45). 
40. In specifying the above principles of the place-based paradigm, the Barca Report 
graciously acknowledged its debt to the experimentalist governance thinking of Sabel and 
his colleagues, which appealed to Fabrizio Barca primarily because it combined bottom-
up localism and agent empowerment with the top-down pressure for standards and testing, 
which meant that “conditionality and subsidiarity can be combined by making the most of 
accumulated experience and by conceiving contracts as a means of learning” (Barca, 
2009: 44).   
41. But in the light of the past ten years, what are we to make of the Barca Report 
today? As the report was the first to fully embrace the principles of democratic 
experimentalism, it seems only fair and reasonable to say of the report what we earlier 
said of Sabel’s experimentalist model: that it is intellectually compelling but politically 
challenging. Two examples will have to suffice to illustrate the point. 
42. The first example concerns the lower level units in the multilevel architecture 
discussed above. These lower level units, be they localities or regions in the EU cohesion 
policy system, are deemed to have the freedom to experiment so as to advance the ends 
that they see fit for their jurisdiction. In reality, however, local units have been literally 
overwhelmed by and imprisoned in a bewildering array of rules and regulations that 
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collectively constitute the EU audit system. Local agents experience a profound 
disconnect in dealing with EU cohesion policy because, at the rhetorical level, they are 
enjoined to be agile, creative and experimental, but in reality they feel heavily constrained 
by a compliance culture that is the kiss of death to local creativity. This problem of over-
regulation is a truly enormous problem and it should not be dismissed as a purely 
ideological trope of neoliberal critics of cohesion policy. Regulatory overload has 
provoked calls for simplification for many years and recently the High Level Group on 
Simplification said that urgent action was necessary because the problem was 
undermining the credibility and the efficacy of cohesion policy: “Over the years, to 
counter the criticism and eliminate mistakes, more rules have been added at European and 
national levels which, rather than helping, are now undermining the trust in the ability of 
beneficiaries, regional and national administrations to manage and use the funds in a 
sound and efficient manner. The volume of rules for Cohesion Policy alone, including 
more than 600 pages of legislation published in the Official Journal (more than double that 
in the period 2007-2013) and over 5000 pages of guidance, has long passed the point of 
being able to be grasped either by beneficiaries or by the authorities involved” (High 
Level Group, 2017:2). In the absence of radical simplification, the experimentalist 
principles of the place-based paradigm stand no chance of being realised in practice. 
43. The second example concerns the upper level of the multilevel architecture. The 
upper level units – principally the European Commission in the case of EU cohesion 
policy – were allotted very exacting tasks in the Barca Report, but did they have the 
capacity to fulfil them? In the case of the European Commission, for example, the Barca 
Report was adamant that a stronger Commission was essential to the success of the entire 
place-based paradigm. Of the ten pillars for reform, pillar 8 called for “refocusing and 
strengthening the role of the Commission as a centre of competence”. Among other things 
this entailed enhancing its position externally vis-a-vis Member States as well as internally 
to promote more internal cooperation between its notoriously balkanised directorates. A 
major investment in human resources was recommended to expedite these reforms and to 
redress the deficits in knowledge and skills, a deficit that is also evident at Member State 
level. Although all these proposals were/are perfectly sound, they have never been put into 
effect for a whole series of reasons, not least because of political opposition to a stronger 
Commission from Member States and because the Commission itself continues to suffer 
from a chronic shortage of staff with strategic design and delivery skills and because the 
mix of skills is such that the compliance function vastly outweighs any creative function 
(Morgan, 2016). 
44. That the promise of the place-based approach has not been realised in practice will 
not come as a surprise to its architect - on the contrary, Fabrizio Barca has been one of the 
first to concede the point. In a keynote address to the Seventh Cohesion Forum in 2017, 
Barca bemoaned the fact that the most important changes associated with the current 
cohesion policy, namely orientation to outcomes, conditionality and true partnership, “are 
well known only within the domain of officials and practitioners, but have not become 
food for thought and public scrutiny for politicians and citizens. The increased role of the 
Commission has remained entrusted to the capacity of officials, and it has been 
encumbered by the fragmentation of European Structural and Investment Funds, the 
escalating burden of auditing and the lack of new human resources” (Barca, 2017: 5). To 
redress these problems he suggested that the Commission should simplify the regulatory 
system, help repair “the broken bridge between people and elites” and undertake a major 
investment to equip itself with a truly developmental skill set by creating: 
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 “a new generation of qualified development experts, coming from all the different 
fields required for this job, and carrying all over Europe the culture and the 
insights of their countries of origin. Just to be clear: I mean 500 new human 
resources, recruited for their competence, critical awareness and “mission 
publique” and responding directly to the unified Directorate or being part of it – 
however, not organised as “technical assistance”. They would be spending most 
of their time and energy in the places where strategies and projects are designed 
and implemented, and would soon be identified by the citizens of Europe as the 
“European pioneers of a close and innovative Union”. It would cost no more than 
two or three megaprojects and its return would be incomparably higher” (Barca, 
2017: 7).  
45. Compelling as they are, these experimentalist proposals are not likely to resonate 
in a European Commission that is currently engaged in an unprecedented series of urgent 
firefighting tasks – migration from without, authoritarianism from within and the 
imponderables of Brexit among others. Even so, the EU needs to ensure that the urgent 
items on its agenda do not sideline the important items and territorial development is 
certainly one of the latter items; so much so that the integrity of the EU as a multilevel 
polity will stand or fall on its capacity to harness the twin principles of solidarity and 
subsidiarity to create territorial development opportunities for all parts of the Union. 
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3.  State-led experimentalism: top-down models  
Section 3 aims to demonstrate that the modalities of experimentalist governance are not 
confined to liberal democratic political systems, with China and Russia being prominent 
examples.. Although they are frequently grouped together, the differences between China 
and Russia are arguably more important than what they have in common.  For example, 
the Chinese experience is particularly instructive because it demonstrates that local 
experiments can thrive under the most elaborate hierarchies if there are well-established 
mechanisms and procedures for nurturing and scaling them.  In Russia, however, the 
“rules of the game” for political behaviour and economic development are so precarious 
and protean that there are few incentives to experiment with novelty, with the result that 
innovation is frustrated by the state rather than fostered.    
46. Some of the most important questions in comparative governance and territorial 
development studies revolve around how and why the role of the state varies so much 
between (apparently) similar capitalist economies and why its interventions have such 
different outcomes from one spatial context to another? One of the great merits of the 
early “Varieties of Capitalism” literature was that it sought to address this question 
directly by exploring the institutional mix of states, markets and networks (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). In the original version there were just two varieties on offer - the “liberal 
market economies” typical of Anglo-American capitalism and the “coordinated market 
economies” like Germany and Japan. Each variety had its strengths and weaknesses: the 
liberal variety was alleged to be more conducive to radical innovation and price-sensitive 
mass production, while the coordinated variety was said to be better attuned to 
incremental innovation and quality-focused flexible specialization (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Since that time it has become clear that new varieties of capitalism have emerged 
that cannot be accommodated by the two original variants, both of which were predicated 
on a firm-centric perspective. Burgeoning state capitalism – especially in The People’s 
Republic of China (China hereafter) and Russia - means that we now have to extend the 
spectrum of “varieties of capitalism” because the state rather than the firm is arguably the 
key unit of analysis in these cases of authoritarian capitalism (Zhang and Peck, 2013; 
Kinossian and Morgan, 2014). In this section we examine state-led experimentalism in 
China and Russia as these are the two most prominent examples of state capitalism in the 
world economy today. 
3.1. China: experimenting under hierarchy 
47. It is well known that China’s emergence as a world economic power owes much to 
the state/market interplay, of state-push and market-pull, a unique combination of political 
power and economic pressure in a governance system where the continuity of one-party 
control has been without precedent in modern times. What is less well known is that 
experimental governance – often erroneously assumed to be confined to liberal democratic 
systems - played a major role in China’s development before and after the “Open Door” 
era began in 1978 and that this governance repertoire helps to explain how the Chinese 
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Communist Party has managed to secure continuity and change, stability and novelty. This 
observation owes a great deal to the work of Sebastian Heilmann (on whom this section 
draws heavily) who says: “China’s experience attests to the potency of experimentation in 
bringing about transformative change, even in a rigid authoritarian, bureaucratic 
environment, and regardless of strong political opposition [...]. At the heart of this 
process, we find a pattern of central-local interaction in generating policy – 
“experimentation under hierarchy” – which constitutes a notable addition to the 
repertoires of governance that have been tried for achieving economic transformation” 
(Heilmann, 2008b: 1).  
48. According to this view, the origins of the Chinese Communist Party’s political 
commitment to decentralised experimentation began in the 1920s, when Mao and his 
colleagues fell under the spell of John Dewey, whose lectures in China in 1919 and 1920 
were very influential, not least because of the stress on learning-by-doing. Dewey taught 
that “There can be no true knowledge without doing. It is only doing that enables us to 
revise our outlook, to organize our facts in a systematic way, and to discover new facts”. 
Dewey's Chinese followers presented experimentation as the core of the Deweyan 
approach to social reform and they even translated “pragmatism” as shiyan zhuyi, a term 
that in a literal translation means "experimentalism" (Heilmann, 2008a: 18). The great 
paradox here is that China’s communist heritage has been tapped to fashion a successful 
governance model that has propelled the Chinese economy into the second biggest 
capitalist country in the world today.  
49. Although various experimental mechanisms have been utilised to promote 
development since 1978, the most important territorial method according to Heilmann has 
been the “experimental zones” (local jurisdictions with broad discretionary powers). The 
most prominent of these are China’s special economic zones, the most famous of which is 
the Shenzen Special Economic Zone, which is deemed to be the most active on account of 
its proximity to Hong Kong and because it generated more than 400 pieces of new 
economic regulation between 1979 and 1990 and “exerted a strong influence on national 
economic legislation with regard to foreign trade and investment” (Heilmann, 2008b:8). 
While liberalisation was initially confined to the special zones on the southern and eastern 
coast, the territorial vehicles of China’s experimental economic governance model, the 
open door policy was extended from the coastal regions to the whole country after 1992 
(Yang, 1997). 
50. Most experimental efforts are initiated by local policymakers who aim to tackle 
pressing local problems and pursue personal career progression at the same time, but in 
doing so they need to “seek the informal backing of their pilot efforts by higher-level 
policy patrons...In a hierarchical system, bottom-up experimentation goes nowhere 
without higher-level patrons or advocates who are indispensable in propagating and 
rolling out locally generated policy innovations...Neither works without the other. The 
dynamics of the experimental process rest precisely on this interplay” (Heilmann, 2008b: 
10). This raises one of the problems of Chinese-style experimentation, namely that 
experiments that do not immediately benefit local elites have little chance of surviving let 
alone of being scaled up to national level. One of the most fascinating aspects of 
Heilmann’s analysis revolves around the uneven impact of this repertoire of 
experimentation under hierarchy: “Experimentation resulted in transformative change 
only in those domains in which new social actors, in particular private entrepreneurs and 
transnational investors, were involved most actively and worked to redefine the 
entrenched rules of the game and power configurations...In policy domains that remained 
under the control of vested state interests and in which state actors tended to lock in 
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partial reforms, as in SOE management (from 1978 to mid-1990s) or stock market 
regulation (1990-2005), extensive experimentation produced incremental innovation at 
best” (Heilmann, 2008b: 20).    
51. The unexpected success of this central-local governance repertoire presents 
problems as well as opportunities, two of which will be especially difficult to resolve. 
First, the translation of locally successful projects into nationally-sponsored policy 
initiatives seems to depend as much on patronage, clientelism and rent-seeking within the 
Chinese multilevel polity as it does on the intrinsic merits of the experimental project. 
Second, the high premium set on local experimentation fuels the predatory behaviour of 
the sub-national state, which has used the sale of land-use rights as a principal means of 
funding overly ambitious urban development projects, spawning a series of “ghost towns” 
in the process.  
52. The urbanisation of economy and society in China has been driven by the interplay 
of central state directives and self-referential local responses that make it difficult to 
coordinate policies, plans and infrastructure. Although cities command most political 
attention, urban scholars argue that suburbs are rapidly becoming the frontier of Chinese 
urbanization because: “The suburbs absorb a vast amount of capital flow – through the 
development of middle class estates and key infrastructure projects leading to an 
expanded transport network, export processing zones, science and university towns, new 
towns, and eco-cities. Territorial development has become an indispensable element of the 
growth machine, while state entrepreneurialism arising after economic devolution and 
globalization secures the conditions for suburban development” (Wu and J. Shen, 
2015:319).   
53. Experimenting with new forms of territorial development has been a quintessential 
feature of China’s economic model since 1978. Although territorial experiments tend to 
focus on economic development issues, they are assuming more and more importance in 
exploring “quality of life” issues, such as new forms of affordable housing, new healthcare 
systems.  
54. Among the territorial experiments underway in China today by far the most 
ambitious is a new zone south of Beijing in a megaproject heralded by state media as the 
most significant one of its kind in a quarter century. The new economic zone – Xiongan 
New Area – is designed to facilitate the economic integration of Beijing, Tianjin and 
Hebei province. Although China has created many special zones to experiment with more 
free-market oriented policies and encourage private and foreign investment, Xiongan New 
Area is the first to enjoy the same national status as the Shenzhen SEZ and the Shanghai 
Pudong New Area, making it “China’s third economic engine”. The new area’s special 
mission is “to deepen institutional reform, explore ways to build smart and ecologically 
friendly cities, develop better infrastructure and efficient transportation networks, and 
pursue further opening-up in a comprehensive way” (Xiaoqi, 2017). 
55. There is some debate surrounding this initiative. Although Xiongan is often 
compared to Shenzhen and Pudong, the comparison may not be entirely precise because:  
“Shenzhen and Pudong are adjacent to Hong Kong and old Shanghai, but 
Xiongan is much further away from Beijing. It is an inland area, in contrast to 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, which are world-class ports. Hong Kong and Shanghai 
have been commercial centres in China’s modern history. The Yangtze River 
Delta, which anchors Shanghai, was a leading economic region of the world for 
centuries. While Tianjin was a commercial and financial centre in the Republican 
era, Beijing was neither a city of commerce nor of industry before 1949. This part 
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of China lacks an established commercial tradition... The will of the state is not 
enough when it comes to effective regional development. While Beijing pushed and 
nudged, it was the market which ultimately made Shenzhen and Pudong the 
successes they are. Beijing should realise that it will be no different for Xiongan – 
and the art of unleashing market forces for a region like Xiongan will be a lot 
more challenging ” (Mok, 2017). 
56. Xiongan will be the biggest test yet of the state’s megaproject capacity. But this 
new test will have to be accomplished alongside a much older and no less intractable test, 
which is how to secure more collaboration between cities and their surrounding regional 
hinterlands, the urban challenge of city-regionalism. The research of Li & Wu (2017) on 
city-region development in China’s Yangtze River Delta (YRD) provides a clear example 
of how inter-governmental relations between regional and national governments shape the 
prospects for intra-regional cooperation and coordination. The YRD, like other Chinese 
regions, continues to feel the impact of a profoundly hierarchical administrative system, 
coupled with administrative decentralisation to local government (which itself consists of 
four levels). These administrative borders have proved particularly resistant to boundary-
spanning initiatives, not least because it is at the local level that party political reputations 
are forged. As a consequence, bottom-up initiatives aimed at addressing regional needs 
find themselves in competition with the priorities of other constituent jurisdictions.  
57. If bottom-up collaboration presents a challenge in the YRD region, so does top-
down planning. Following previous abortive attempts to stimulate regional working, in 
2010 a centrally-commissioned YRD Regional Plan was approved. Yet while this 
provides a framework for the region, it provides for neither the structures nor the funding 
that would underpin its implementation, and local authorities continue to lack the powers 
to enact cross-boundary initiatives. In addition, the level of detail written into the plan 
serves to constrain “local discretion” and “impose [central government’s] regional vision 
upon locally initiated development” (Li and Wu, 2017: 317). 
58. The twin challenges of megaproject planning in Xiongan and city-regionalism in 
the YRD region are reminders that centralised political power, no matter how concentrated 
in one party or one person, has limits that no amount of local experimentation can 
transcend. But since it has achieved so much in the past thirty years, it would be foolish to 
discount the power of this distinctive model of experimentation because: “the unexpected 
capacity of the Chinese party-state to find innovative solutions to long-standing or newly 
emerging challenges in economic development rests on the broad-based entrepreneurship, 
adaptation, and learning facilitated by experimentation under hierarchy. The combination 
of decentralized experimentation with ad hoc central interference, which results in 
selective integration of local experiences into national policymaking, is a key to 
understanding how a distinctive policy process has contributed to China’s economic rise” 
(Heilmann, 2008b:23). 
3.2. Russia: development by decree 
59. Western theories of governance may be less helpful than we think in studying 
territorial development in Russia, not least because the conventional idea of post-socialist 
transition, which implies a gradual shift to Western-type liberal democracy, may not be 
fully suited.   Much more relevant is the concept of the “dual state”, which conveys the 
idea that the legal-normative system based on constitutional order is systematically 
challenged by opaque or arbitrary arrangements populated by contending factions in and 
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around the Kremlin: “The tension between the two is the defining feature of contemporary 
Russian politics” (Sakwa, 2011: viii).  
60. The dual state is a by-product of the re-assertion of the “strong state”, the hallmark 
of the Putin presidencies. The rise of a strong central state, based in the Kremlin, was 
established under the first Putin presidency through political campaigns against regional 
governors and business leaders, the two biggest threats to the Kremlin’s authority in the 
1990s. The abolition of direct gubernatorial elections in favour of an appointment system 
between 2005-2012 reduced the political authority of regional governors. New rules 
introduced in 2012 made it practically impossible for candidates not endorsed by the 
Kremlin’s United Russia party to register as candidates for gubernatorial election. 
61. Macro-political developments in Russia are critically important to an 
understanding of the balance of power in the governance system of the Russian 
Federation, where territorial experiments are only possible if they secure the political 
patronage of the central government. Since the collapse of the Soviet system, planners in 
Russia have been trying to develop a new spatial matrix for the Russian economy that 
would secure growth and at the same time address significant spatial disparities without 
suffocating growth (Kinossian, 2013).  
62. Territorial development policy in recent years has revolved around large cities as 
the hubs of Russia’s new economy. The ‘metropolitan turn’ in Russian spatial policy aims 
to spatially rebalance the Russian economy around new urban centres that would become 
new engines of growth for the Russian economy. These plans have been informed by the 
city-centric narratives of economic development prevalent in the West because: “The urge 
to modernise Russia’s economy, and the fascination with the achievements of the leading 
economic powers, have led to a simplistic notion that growth can be achieved by 
replicating physical structures that embody and symbolise the success of Western 
economies. Spatial structures in the West came about through the evolution of economic 
and political institutions. Reconstructing the end-product of capitalist urbanisation would 
not necessarily generate innovation, diverse economic structure, and growth” (Kinossian, 
2016: 9).  
63. The most ambitious example of the ‘metropolitan turn’ in Russian spatial policy is 
the Skolkovo megaproject, which aims to create a regional innovation cluster on a 400 
hectare greenfield site on the southwest outskirts of Moscow, a project that was dubbed 
the Russian “Silicon Valley” (Clover, 2010). The centre would focus on the ‘five 
presidential high-tech sectors’, including energy, IT, telecommunication, biomedical and 
nuclear research, and drew parallels with Silicon Valley. In common with other mega-
projects, the state took the lead in initiating the project as the implementation of the 
project required special governing arrangements. In May 2010, a non-commercial 
organization, the Foundation for Development of the Centre for Elaboration and 
Commercialization of New Technologies was created to manage the Skolkovo project. In 
order to create enabling regimes for customs, taxation, immigration and administration, a 
special federal law was passed to exempt Skolkovo from various Russian legal norms and 
regulations. According to the law, the project aimed ‘to create and support operation of an 
autonomous territorial complex dedicated to research and development and 
commercialization of deliverables thereof’. To establish the intellectual credentials of the 
megaproject, the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skolkovo Tech) was 
established in 2011 in collaboration with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
to conduct research and teaching within the five strategic research priorities. Critics 
challenged the plans to create an entirely new research complex rather than upgrading 
existing research facilities located in Russia’s ‘science towns’, at a lower cost. The 
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conflict between the established research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
and the Skolkovo community only increased when it was reported that some USD 302.5 
million of government funding for the megaproject would be allocated to MIT as a 
development grant for designing the Skolkovo Tech strategy (Kinossian and Morgan, 
2014). 
64. The Skolkovo megaproject began to unravel amidst a spate of financial scandals 
and political faction fights within the dual state, with the result that major supporters 
gradually withdrew from the project. Furthermore, the plans to involve top international 
corporate brands in the Skolkovo project are threatened by sanctions imposed by the 
international community, illustrating how the geopolitical ambitions of the strong state are 
at odds with its economic ambitions.    
65. An equally ambitious territorial experiment is underway in the Arctic, where the 
Russian strategy is founded on a combination of economic and geopolitical 
considerations. In economic terms the Arctic has been targeted as a rich resource base to 
enhance Russia’s status as an energy superpower, while in geopolitical terms it is an 
expression of national power and prestige. .  
66. With the advent of the Arctic as a strategic national priority, the northern regions 
have been obliged to factor this new priority into their own territorial development plans. 
Given the high level of fiscal dependency of regions on the centre, the governance system 
has created a highly competitive regime for accessing federal funding. Success in securing 
federal grants largely depends on the ability of regional leaders to convince Moscow of 
their development plans, consequently regional elites feel obliged to align their 
development strategies to the shifting preferences of the centre (Kinossian, 2012). 
Russia’s Arctic zone stretches along the coastline from Murmansk Oblast’ to Chukotka 
and it straddles several regions. Given the top-down dynamics of the federal fiscal system, 
it was not surprising that, to benefit from the growing interest of the central government in 
Arctic expansion, the Government of Murmansk Oblast’ decided to revise its own strategy 
to reflect the new national priorities, positioning itself as a strategic centre of the Russian 
Arctic. As in the Skolkovo case, Moscow designs special territorial provisions for priority 
regions when they commit to national goals, but this can be a mixed blessing for the 
regions concerned because national priorities can suddenly change,  and the subsidy flow 
takes a new direction. The territorial experiment in the Arctic provides important insights 
into central-local dynamics in the Russian Federation because: “In practical terms, despite 
the rhetoric of the strong developmental state, policies are often unrealistic, poorly 
coordinated, and switch between shifting priorities as a result of the protean politics of the 
Kremlin […]. Although the country is increasingly governed from Moscow, the regions 
are not mere recipients of plans and performance indicators designed within the 
uppermost tier of government. In modern Russia, regions construct their policies to meet 
the developmental priorities of central government. The priorities of the federal centre are 
often incoherent, lack realistic strategies for implementation, and shift over time, thereby 
complicating the work of regional policy makers” (Kinossian, 2016: 233).  
67. But the key point to make about Russia today is that the Kremlin’s politics has 
sought to eliminate competition and promote concentration of resources and political 
power in the hands of a small elite. This limits the scope for the kinds of local 
experimentation that are crucial to an enormously diverse country like the Russian 
Federation. Innovation and territorial development depend on local experimentation and 
development by decree is the antithesis of locally-based experiments.  
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4.  State-sponsored experimentalism: bottom-up models 
Section 4 explores the state-sponsored models of experimentalist governance that are 
underway in OECD countries. Three of the most prominent models are explored in detail, 
namely the new industrial policy paradigm associated with the work of Dani Rodrik, the 
entrepreneurial state thesis developed by Mariana Mazzucato and the public sector 
innovation lab championed by the likes of NESTA.  Although each of these initiatives aims 
to tackle the challenge of novelty, the section argues that they all face a common problem 
in the form of a risk-averse public sector culture, which means that government and its 
public sector bodies invariably find it difficult to negotiate such things as failure, feedback 
and learning. Unless the public sector learns to adopt a higher threshold for failure and 
becomes more risk-aware and less risk-averse, the section suggests that these bottom-up 
models of experiments are unlikely to realise their potential. 
68. The state-sponsored models considered in this section provide a stark contrast to 
the state-led models in China and Russia. Three bottom-up models are examined in turn – 
the new industrial policy paradigm, the entrepreneurial state thesis and the rise of the 
public sector innovation lab.     
4.1. The new industrial policy paradigm 
69. Perhaps the most striking development in economic policy in OECD countries 
over the past fifteen years has been the rehabilitation of industrial policy as a legitimate 
and indeed necessary part of the repertoire of state engagement in the knowledge 
economy. Governments of all political persuasions have embraced a version of industrial 
policy for some or all of the following reasons. First, a unique set of systemic challenges – 
like accelerating technological change, burgeoning globalisation, labour market 
polarisation and the ecological threats of climate change for example – has persuaded 
governments that they need to alter the character of economic growth to render it more 
ecologically sustainable and more socially inclusive.  Second, the financial crises of the 
past decade exposed the way that laissez-faire policies have encouraged excessive 
development in non-tradable sectors (like property speculation) at the expense of tradable 
sectors that are more sustainable. Third, the rapid development of China as a world 
economic power has been partly attributed to its targeted state policies and this has 
induced other countries to defend their markets and technologies through industrial 
policies that are increasingly informed by national security concerns. Finally, the 
mainstream intellectual environment is becoming less tolerant of neoliberal binaries, such 
as private v public and market v state, and more receptive to the idea that a judicious 
combination of states, markets and networks is what really matters (Aghion et al, 2011; 
Rodrik, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).    
70. No one has done more to rehabilitate the credentials of industrial policy than Dani 
Rodrik, beginning with a highly influential paper for UNIDO in 2004 that was aptly called 
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Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century (Rodrik, 2004) and republished later in a 
book of essays called One Economics, Many Recipes (Rodrik, 2007).  
71. Rodrik has sought to establish the intellectual credentials for a dynamic and 
enlightened industrial policy by addressing two objections that neo-liberal critics 
invariably employ to discredit state intervention. The first concerns the informational 
objection, which maintains that states cannot “pick winners” because they can never 
possess all the necessary information to do so, the Hayekian argument. The second 
objection is that industrial policy inadvertently encourages corruption and rent seeking 
behaviour by diverting corporate attention from entrepreneurial activity to lobbying and 
more noxious activity (Rodrik, 2007). To overcome these problems Rodrik identifies three 
institutional design features for a smart industrial policy, namely embeddedness, discipline 
and accountability. 
 The concept of “embedded autonomy” was first developed by Peter Evans to 
account for the role of state agencies in South Korea, where they were embedded 
in but not beholden to business networks that allowed them to learn about the 
bottlenecks to innovation and development. Rodrik draws on this concept to argue 
that the best way to think about industrial policy is in terms of “a process of 
discovery, by the government no less than the private sector”.  
 Second, to mitigate the risks of corruption and rent seeking behaviour, the 
industrial policy process needs to incorporate more rigorous forms of discipline. In 
short, “discipline requires clear objectives, measurable targets, close monitoring, 
proper evaluation, well-designed rules and professionalism. With these 
institutional safeguards in place, it becomes easier to revise policies and 
programs along the way, and to let losers go when the circumstances warrant it” 
(Rodrik, 2013:28). 
 The third element of the institutional architecture for enlightened industrial policy 
is public accountability. Public agencies need to explain what they are doing and 
how they are doing it and they must be as “transparent about their failures as 
their successes” (Rodrik, 2013: 28).  
72. As Rodrik freely concedes, these ideas have much in common with Charles 
Sabel’s concept of experimentalist governance, which emphasises the shortcomings of the 
hierarchical, principal-agent model. Because the principal-agent model is not well suited 
to volatile environments, not least because it assumes an ex-ante omniscience on the part 
of the principal which is unwarranted, what is needed instead “is a more flexible form of 
strategic collaboration between public and private sectors, designed to elicit information 
about objectives, distribute responsibilities for solutions, and evaluate outcomes as they 
appear. An ideal industrial policy process operates in an institutional setting of this form” 
(Rodrik, 2004:18).  
73. With its emphasis on the processing and aggregation of local knowledge, rather 
than generic best-practice templates, Rodrik’s conception of industrial policy is a 
quintessentially experimental process in which the big challenge is crafting the 
collaborative process of discovery between state and industry rather than obsessing about 
the outcomes that cannot be known ex-ante or the policy instruments whose efficacy 
depends on the spatial context in which they are deployed and the calibre of the 
institutions that are doing the deploying. These ideas have helped to shape the thinking of 
theorists and policymakers alike and they played a big role in framing the concept and the 
policy of smart specialisation as we shall see in section 5.1 below.  
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74. While the new industrial policy paradigm is certainly a robust intellectual 
conception, it tends to gloss over some of the challenges that arise when such policies are 
deployed in practice. Three challenges that deserve to be treated more seriously are: 
feedback, failure and learning (Morgan, 2017b). 
75. Although the significance of reliable feedback is widely acknowledged, especially 
in evolutionary theories of change, we tend to assume that it is readily available. The truth 
of the matter however is that feedback is filtered and tempered by a whole series of things, 
like power, status, hierarchy, fear, and ambition. That “whistleblower” laws have been 
introduced in many countries to help public sector workers find their “voice” clearly 
speaks volumes for the fact that feedback faces formidable obstacles and on no account 
should it be assumed to be easily forthcoming.  
76. If feedback is hard to manage, failure is even more difficult to accomodate, 
especially in the public sector where taxpayers’ money is at stake. Failure in the public 
sector can spell disaster for managers and their political masters. Rodrik is surely right to 
argue that we need to have a higher tolerance of failure, because it is part and parcel of 
experimentation and innovation, and therefore the aim should be not to try to outlaw 
mistakes but to reduce the costs of mistakes by learning from them and by learning to fail 
faster so to speak. To have a more enlightened understanding of failure in the public 
sector, policy innovators will need to mobilise a wider constituency so as to include such 
groups as public auditors, legal advisers and of course politicians, the very people that are 
responsible for fuelling the risk-averse culture that stymies innovation in the public sector. 
77. Finally, the public sector will need to allocate more space, time and resources to 
learning about what works where and why if the new industrial policy paradigm is to have 
practical traction because monitoring and evaluation are still seen as low status activities. 
The barriers to organisational learning in the civil service – silo structures, staff turnover, 
ineffective mechanisms to support the acquisition and dissemination of good practice and 
the lack of time devoted to learning – are common to the public sector in many countries 
and these features are manifestly at odds with the “smart state” assumptions of the new 
industrial policy paradigm.  
4.2. The entrepreneurial state thesis 
78. The entrepreneurial state thesis developed by Mariana Mazzucato is perhaps the 
most prominent example of the new industrial policy paradigm. Her book, The 
Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, is “an open call to 
change the way we talk about the State, its role in the economy, and the images and ideas 
we use to describe that role” (Mazzucato, 2013:198). There has never been a more 
important time to discuss the creative potential of the public sector, she argues, because in 
most parts of the world we are witnessing “a massive withdrawal” of the state on the 
purely ideological grounds that it is deemed to be a drag on innovation and economic 
development. To counter this stereotyping of the state, Mazzucato talks up the manifold 
ways in which the public sector has helped to fashion the knowledge economy. To 
illustrate the point, she highlights “the state behind the iPhone”, arguing that all the 
technologies that make Apple’s iPhone so “smart” – Internet, GPS, touch-screen display, 
and the SIRI voice activated personal assistant – were actually the products of public 
funding.    
79. This is one among many examples that are used to illustrate the entrepreneurial 
role that the public sector has played in nurturing and steering the knowledge economy. In 
the case of the United States, she argues, the state has backed the microchip, the Internet, 
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biotechnology and nanotechnology, all of which were handsomely funded through public 
agencies, especially through DARPA, the NSF and the National Institutes of Health.  
80. Although this is a compelling antidote to the negative stereotypes of the state that 
populate neo-liberal narratives of innovation and development, the analysis is marred by 
two problems: (i) the thesis is heavily predicated on the example of DARPA, a unique 
public sector mission-led agency and (ii) the thesis elides the public sector barriers to 
entrepreneurial behaviour. 
81. The public sector agency that seems to embody the traits of the entrepreneurial 
state to a greater extent than any other in Mazzucato’s perspective is the Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an arm of the US Department of Defence. 
Created in 1958, following the Sputnik shock, DARPA has been at the heart of product 
and process innovation in the knowledge economy and it is part of the “hidden 
developmental state in the United States” (Block, 2008). With an annual budget of more 
than $3 billion, a highly specialised staff of 240 and a risk tolerant mandate to nurture 
novel technologies, DARPA is a unique agency, in no way typical of the public sector. 
These unique attributes help to explain why DARPA has been so adept at effective 
technology brokering, which links scientists and engineers to wider commercial networks, 
a function that has been aptly described as “the most central developmental task” (Block, 
2008).  
82. If the creativity of the public sector is overplayed in the entrepreneurial state 
thesis, the barriers to creativity are underplayed. In a more recent book, The Value of 
Everything, Mazzucato develops the thesis by calling for a more entrepreneurial mindset 
in the public sector. Public institutions, she argues, “must get over the self-fulfilling fear of 
failure, and realise that experimentation and trial and error (and error and error) are 
part of the learning process” (Mazzucato, 2018:266). All the criticisms levelled above – 
regarding the elisions in the new industrial policy paradigm – are equally applicable to the 
entrepreneurial state thesis because it also fails to sufficiently address the problems of 
failure, feedback and learning in the public sector.  
83. Although Mazzucato tends to be blasé about the “fear of failure” in the public 
sector, the problem of dealing with the politics of failure is a genuinely fearsome problem 
– and the demise of Solyndra is a perfect example. A solar power start-up with a radical 
new technology, Solyndra quickly went from being the toast of Silicon Valley following 
its founding in 2005 to being bankrupt in 2011, partly because solar prices plunged 60% in 
three years and partly because it was unable to compete on costs with rivals in China, 
where the government had poured an estimated £30 billion into its solar manufacturers in 
2010. While the Obama administration was shown to have been above board in its 
dealings with the company, “Solyndra has become Republican shorthand for ineptitude, 
cronyism, and the failure of green industrial policy” (Grunwald, 2012: 272).  
84. But the real lesson of the Solyndra experiment would seem to lie elsewhere 
because: “The lesson, however, is not that the administration should not have subsidized a 
company that eventually failed. There is no economic reason that the government should 
recover every loan. In view of the environmental and technological externalities, there is 
not even a case for insisting that the loan portfolio as a whole should make a profit or 
break even. The real lesson is that there were no safeguards in place against political 
manipulation and to ensure DOE could pull the plug if circumstances warranted it. Worse 
yet, the administration made it harder to reverse course by committing itself to the project 
politically” (Rodrik, 2014: 482).  
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85. To reduce the costs of this kind of failure – the financial costs as well as the 
political costs - governments need (i) to allocate more time and attention to conducting ex-
ante due diligence assessments and (ii) to be more open and transparent regarding the 
economics of the portfolio approach to investment, where failure is a symptom of 
normality rather than a sign of irregularity or criminality. This underlines the importance 
of having high calibre skill sets in the public sector, another issue that tends to be elided in 
the entrepreneurial state thesis.  
4.3. Public sector innovation labs 
86. The rise of the public sector innovation (PSI) lab is perhaps the most tangible sign 
that governments at all levels of the multilevel polity are genuinely trying to grapple with 
the challenges of novelty. The UK innovation foundation, NESTA, is one of the most 
prominent pioneers of public and social labs as a means of addressing societal challenges 
through evidence-based local experiments. Geoff Mulgan, NESTA’s chief executive, has 
documented the growth of the lab movement and argues that labs need to be both insiders 
and outsiders at the same time, which means they face the classic ‘radical’s dilemma’. “If 
they stand too much inside the system”, he argues, “they risk losing their radical edge; if 
they stand too far outside they risk having little impact. It follows that the most crucial 
skill they need to learn is how to navigate the inherently unstable role of being both 
insiders and outsiders; campaigners and deliverers; visionaries and pragmatists”. 
Although there is no concise definition of a public or social lab, he suggests it might 
include “experimentation in a safe space at one remove from everyday reality, with the 
goal of generating useful ideas that address social needs and demonstrating their 
effectiveness” (Mulgan, 2014: 2).  
87. Public sector labs need to be given much more prominence because, while they are 
in the forefront of public sector innovation, their mandates depend on political discretion 
and this helps to explain why they tend to have short lifespans. Even so, the growing 
emphasis on public sector innovation in OECD countries will ensure that such labs 
become more rather than less important in the future (Daglio et al., 2015). 
88. Two large scale surveys have shed new light on the spread of labs. First, a study of 
20 labs by Nesta and Bloomberg Philanthropies drew some useful analytical distinctions 
by identifying four categories of lab: developers and creators of innovation (those who 
address specific challenges); enablers (those who introduce insights from outside the 
public sector); educators (those who seek to transform processes and organisational 
culture); and architects (those who focus on system and policy level change) (Puttick et al. 
2014). Whatever their remit, these labs are invariably created to deal with the growing 
complexity of policymaking in an era of accelerating social and technological change and 
they are distinguished by their commitment to working in a manner that is user-focused, 
cross-sectoral and data-driven, a stark contrast to the silos and hierarchies of the 
conventional public sector.  
89. In a second survey of 35 labs around a third had been established at the municipal 
level, suggesting that cities and municipalities are just as likely to launch PSI labs as 
national governments. For over 60% of the teams the primary source of income was self-
generated, that is project-based funding, closely followed by direct budgetary transfers 
from the sponsoring government department. Another significant feature concerned the 
skill mix of the labs. The PSI labs brought together heterogeneous teams of researchers, 
designers, and stakeholders to discover and analyse problems from different angles and 
they employed people from backgrounds generally new to the public sector – in such 
  │ 29 
 
  
  
varied fields as design, anthropology, ethnography, social geography, as well as political 
science, sociology, and communication etc. But the conclusions of the survey painted a 
mixed picture of PSI labs in two respects. 
90. Firstly, although prominent in many modern public management strategies, PSI 
labs were found to be far from an organic part of public sector: “The main source of 
autonomy as well as survival is high level political and/or administrative support, 
meaning that once an i-lab loses its sponsors, the survival chances diminish radically. 
This has created an interesting paradox– smaller i-labs are easier to close down, whereas 
larger i-labs face the risk of losing flexibility and freedom to act. One of the consequences 
of this paradox has been rather short life-spans of experimental i-labs”. Secondly, one of 
the tasks of such semi-autonomous spaces is to catalyse change in the public sector, like a 
skunk works in the private sector. But the precarious lifecycle of labs and the lack of 
support for mainstreaming new solutions serves to “limit the potential of i-labs to act as 
change-agents” (Tonurist et al., 2015).   
91. Even so, these problems have not stymied the growth of PSI labs, especially in 
Europe, where there were more than 60 labs in operation in 2016. Most of these labs were 
not specialized or geared towards a specific type of policy; rather they were applying a 
user-focused, experiment-oriented approach to policy design as a means of driving 
innovation across a wide spectrum of policy domains. However, many of these European 
labs were also found to be extremely fragile, with the two biggest threats to their existence 
being “budget cuts and changes in elected officials” (Fuller and Lochard, 2016: 17). 
92. Two of the biggest questions now being asked about PSI labs are: (i) how can they 
become more effective catalysts for systemic change in the mainstream life of the public 
sector and (ii) does their rapid growth mean that public policy is becoming more data-
driven and evidence-based?  
93. To date the catalytic role of PSI labs has been constrained by two main factors: by 
their short lifespans and by the fact that they operate at one remove from everyday reality. 
Some lab leaders now believe that the best way to solve the longevity problem is by 
working more closely with frontline public services, sacrificing the autonomy they have 
enjoyed in the past for greater relevance (and hopefully longevity) in the future. The 
Swedish innovation agency, Vinnova, is one of the public bodies that has led the way in 
searching for a more realistic lab format, with its Reality Labs concept.  Since 2011 
Vinnova has been experimenting with a number of concepts to support public service 
innovation, starting with the concept of Innovation Sluices (organisational structures to 
support ideas from public servants and help turn them into reality) and then it developed 
that concept into Testbeds (which helped outside organisations work together with the 
public sector and test new ideas).  
94. According to Tobias Ohman, Vinnova’s programme manager, the Reality Labs 
concept signals a radically new phase of trying to integrate labs with frontline service 
provision, hence the name:  
“What we want to achieve now with the Reality Labs is to fund innovation 
structures in the public sector to build ‘labs’ at the very point of value creation: 
that is, for instance, at the clinic or in the classroom where healthcare or 
education is delivered. By pushing the public sector to open these structures for 
experimentation, we believe we will get more tests running in the real world and 
solutions that are immediately relevant to the real world and real users. The 
difference with Reality Labs and other innovation labs is the proximity to the 
frontline, and that we require the reality labs to be focused on a technology or 
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need-based area, for example the transitions between healthcare and elderly care, 
or AI and diagnostics at the point of care (for example, digital solutions for 
university students with special needs). Through this, we hope to create clusters of 
interest and expertise. Like the ‘old’ testbeds, these labs should be able to interact 
with external stakeholders. Unlike the testbeds, however, the public sector will 
have the initiative by proactively searching for appropriate solutions instead of 
testing every imagined solution that is ‘knocking on the door’ of the testbed” 
(Quaggiotto, 2017).  
95. Vinnova has already funded 15 Reality Labs through an open call. Although it is 
not overly prescriptive as to what a PSI lab is required to do, it has identified seven 
principles which it believes are essential to the success of a lab, namely: 
1. That the lab is really performing experiments in the organisation’s core business, 
at the front end. 
2. That they can express a special focus of interest that is specific but at the same 
time with broader applicability (beyond the local context). 
3. That they know the market of their focus of interest, and that they have an 
ambition to communicate their results. 
4. That the experimentation process is open to other stakeholders, that there is a 
possibility to participate and that there is an agile mindset, with experiments 
performed iteratively and with possibilities to quickly initiate and terminate co-
operations with external entities. 
5. That the applicant is building an organisation for testing and experimentation with 
high potential to survive after the funded project is over. That is, a business model 
of some sort. 
6. That they have an integrated policy strategy from the start; they should understand 
what policies apply in their area of focus and how to change/influence them. 
7. That they should (in most cases) have a clear view of how to utilise digital services 
(Quaggiotto, 2017). 
96. Vinnova’s experience will be monitored and mimicked very quickly because one 
of the merits of the international lab movement is its generous ethos of mutual support and 
learning-by-interacting thanks to such forums as the Innovation Growth Lab (which is led 
by NESTA and which aims to make innovation and growth policy more experimental and 
evidence-based) and associations such as the European Network of Living Labs and the 
Global Living Labs organisation.  
97. Turning to the second question posed earlier: does the growth of PSI labs mean 
that public policy is becoming more data-driven and evidence-based? The short answer is 
not necessarily because this will depend on the relevance of the lab and its capacity to 
generate real world solutions that can be sufficiently scaled up to make a difference to 
frontline service providers. In addition to these supply-side factors, it will also depend on 
the character and quality of the demand-side of the policymaking process – on the 
absorptive capacity of politicians and their commitment to evidence-based policy. The 
positivist presumption that better evidence will lead to more effective policies has been 
rightly dismissed by critics as a naively rationalist, ‘technocratic wish in a political world’ 
that presumes an all too linear relationship between evidence and policymaking and an 
untenable distinction between (policy) facts and (political) values (Mcgann et al., 2018).  
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98. If the future of PSI labs seems assured – not least because the public sector will be 
compelled to experiment and innovate to meet ever more complex societal challenges – 
the key debate will revolve around what constitutes “success”. On the question of metrics 
it would seem that “the most obvious – if imperfect – short-term metric of success is being 
seen to be useful by key holders of power and resources” (Mulgan, 2014: 8).  
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5.  Sub-national worlds of experimentalism 
National level initiatives may command most media attention when it comes to 
innovations in governance, but it is the sub-national level of cities, regions and localities 
where new forms of experimentalist governance have been pioneered. Section 5 explores 
this sub-national world of experimentalism by focusing on a number of different territorial 
models, namely: the well-established paradigm of regional innovation systems; the 
manifold forms of city-regionalism; the advent of the new localism; and the very recent 
example of the foundational economy, perhaps the most radical and challenging form of 
place-based experimentalism considered here.   
99. The literature on sub-national governance and development has flourished to such 
an extent in recent years that it is not easy to classify it in distinct categories because there 
are so many spillovers and overlaps. Purely for the sake of convenience this section will 
synthesise this vast literature under four theoretical perspectives: (i) regional innovation 
systems; (ii) city-regionalism; (iii) new localism; and (iv) the foundational economy.  
100. Each of these theoretical perspectives offers its own interpretation of experimental 
governance and territorial development. 
5.1. Regional innovation systems: the S3 challenge 
101. The regional innovation systems (RIS) perspective has dominated the debate on 
regional development over the past two decades and it has been enormously influential in 
shaping the cognitive framings of territorial development in theory, policy and practice. At 
the heart of the RIS perspective is the claim that the most innovative regions are those in 
which the key institutions – firms, their supply chains, governments, universities and the 
like – are able and willing to work in concert to find joint solutions to common problems. 
In this respect the RIS perspective has affinities with other territorial innovation models, 
such as industrial districts, innovative milieu, technology clusters and learning regions 
(Asheim, 1996; Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Morgan, 1997; Moulaert and Sekia, 2003). 
Notwithstanding its influence in the academic and policy-making worlds, however, the 
original RIS perspective has been criticised for being too static, too bounded in its 
conception of space and too insensitive to the problems of lagging regions where the 
institutional milieu is less conducive to the collaborative forms of innovation that 
characterise more dynamic regions (Uyarra, 2010; Marques and Morgan, 2018). These 
criticisms have surfaced again in the current debate about smart specialisation, the latest 
form of regional innovation policy in the EU, which will be used to illustrate the key 
arguments. 
102. The origin of the RIS concept lies in the convergence of two hitherto separate 
bodies of theory. The first was regional science, with its interest in explaining the 
locational distribution of high-tech industry, technology parks and, above all, the uneven 
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spatial character of innovation and development. The second was the national systems of 
innovation literature, which demonstrated that innovation processes were interactive rather 
than linear and mediated by nationally-based institutions that gave innovation a systemic 
and national character (Cooke, 1998). Although there are many variants of RIS, ranging 
from state-led dirigiste models to market-driven localist models, the common denominator 
is a strong focus on actors, networks and institutions. A recent state-of-the-art review of 
the RIS literature conveys the point very well:  
“Conceptualisations of RISs vary but most protagonists agree that these systems—
like other innovation system variants—are made up of three core elements, that is, 
actors, networks and institutions. Key actors of RIS are the firms and industries 
located in the region as well as organisations that belong to the knowledge and 
support infrastructure such as research institutes, educational bodies and 
knowledge transfer agencies. Networks that facilitate knowledge flows and 
interactive learning between these actors are seen as eminently important for 
dynamic innovation activities to unfold. The ‘functioning’ of RIS is seen as being 
influenced by an institutional framework of formal rules and informal norms. A 
central argument in the RIS approach is that innovation does not take place in 
isolation, it includes interactive learning in localized innovation networks that are 
embedded in specific socio-cultural settings. But one should also underline that 
RISs are open systems in which organisations source knowledge through extra-
regional production and innovation networks” (Isaksen et al., 2018: 2). 
103. One of the great merits of the RIS approach is that it demonstrates in theory and 
practice that innovation is a place-dependent as well as a path-dependent process and that 
policy responses need to be attuned to the granular conditions in each specific region 
rather than derived from a “best practice” policy template. Regional innovation policy 
design will depend on the type of region in question and a highly influential regional 
typology has been developed that distinguishes between the organisational thinness of 
peripheral regions, the lock-in problems of old industrial regions, and the internal system 
fragmentation of highly diversified metropolitan regions. To address the diversity of these 
place-based challenges, the most important policy priority is to abandon a “one-size-fits-
all” mindset and embrace a more granular approach that respects the specificity of places 
(Todtling and Trippl, 2005; Coenen et al, 2016).  
104. In response to criticisms that the RIS approach was too static, scholars have begun 
to investigate how a RIS can influence the nature and direction of regional economic 
change by fashioning new growth paths. This work connects the RIS approach with 
evolutionary theories on path dependence to examine how RISs promote or hinder 
economic diversification, but it does so in a manner that combines multi-scalar analysis, 
thereby avoiding the overly micro-focused analyses of evolutionary economic 
geographers. Leading advocates of the RIS approach suggest that “different types of RIS 
show varying capacities to nurture new path development. This is attributed to differences 
in the degree of ‘thickness’ and diversity of the organisational structures of RIS. These 
features are seen to shape the capacity of RIS to grow new paths by means of endogenous 
assets and to influence their potential to develop new paths by attracting, absorbing and 
anchoring non-local knowledge and resources” (Isaksen et al., 2018: 5).  
105. Many of the basic ideas of the RIS approach – like the place-dependent nature of 
innovation, the role of institutional thickness, the importance of inter-organisational 
networks for generating and exploiting knowledge and the integrity of governance 
mechanisms etc – informed smart specialisation, the concept that was rapidly propelled 
from the margins of the academy to the mainstream of regional policy in the EU.  
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106. As a policy concept, smart specialisation was designed with a dual purpose in 
mind: (i) to expedite agglomeration processes by reducing duplicative regional 
investments in science and technology and (ii) to encourage regional players, especially 
regional governments, to “particularise themselves by generating and stimulating the 
growth of new exploration and research activities, which are related to existing 
productive structures and show the potential to transform those structures. This is the 
rationale for smart specialisation” (Foray, 2015: 11). The main architect of the smart 
specialisation concept, Dominique Foray, drew on the experimentalist governance ideas of 
Sabel and Rodrik to develop the idea of the entrepreneurial discovery process, the core of 
the smart specialisation conception. According to Foray, “the discovery and collective-
experimentation process forms an integral part of political action and must be carried out 
within the framework of strategic interactions between the government and the private 
sector. This is the essence of entrepreneurial discovery” (Foray, 2015: 5).     
107. Forging collaborative arrangements between governments, firms and universities 
in a “framework of strategic interactions” is proving to be one of the most difficult 
challenges in the implementation phase of smart specialisation in the EU, especially in the 
context of lagging regions where there has been little or no tradition of such collaboration 
(Marques and Morgan, 2018; Blazek and Morgan, 2018).  To be fair, Foray was alive to 
this problem, saying: “The most peripheral and less advanced regions will be in difficulty 
when it comes to developing a smart specialisation strategy. The lack of entrepreneurial 
capacities and the weakness of administrative capacities will combine to make this 
process uncertain and almost impossible” (Foray, 2015: 66). These weaknesses are 
especially apparent with respect to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activity. One of the 
enduring problems of regional innovation policy throughout its history, a problem that 
persists today, is the low political commitment to M&E mechanisms. As regards 
monitoring, the 2017 Fraunhofer survey found that the situation had not improved from 
the previous year: while two-thirds of respondents claimed that their region had some 
monitoring concept, only half of those had the capacity to track RIS3 priorities in an 
informed way (Kroll, 2017:12). 
108. Because regional practitioners tend to see M&E in terms of an externally imposed 
audit function – a command and control tool to police compliance – they miss the real 
significance of M&E activity: that it is primarily a learning tool and not a compliance tool. 
This was the key point that Charles Sabel made at the Smart Regions Conference in 
Brussels in 2016, when he argued that RIS3 needed more diagnostic monitoring, which 
involves “monitoring to underscore the continuing need at all levels to check on progress, 
given the limits of planning, and diagnostic because the aim is to facilitate and organize 
problem solving by the actors, not to use the threat of punishment for bad performance as 
an incentive for good behaviour” (Sabel, 2016). In the absence of diagnostic monitoring, 
he warned, “RIS3 could become a new name for business as usual” (Sabel, 2016).  
109. In the light of practical experience, what is becoming clear is that smart 
specialisation was largely predicated on the formal and informal institutional milieu of 
northern Europe, countries that had the capacity to design and deliver place-based 
innovation policies. This northern-centric presumption has triggered a sympathetic 
critique of smart specialisation policy:  
“sympathetic because of its ambition and the fact that it recognises innovation for 
what it really is, namely a collective social endeavour; and a critique because it 
makes some unwarranted assumptions – heroic assumptions – about the 
institutional capacity of lagging regions to design and deliver such a sophisticated 
regional innovation policy...We suggest that these unwarranted policy 
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assumptions have arisen in part because of two problematical trends: (i) the 
uncritical embrace of empirically challenged conceptual models and (ii) the 
intellectual bias that extols policy design over policy delivery, with the result that 
the prosaic world of implementation is either neglected or ignored” (Marques and 
Morgan, 2018: 289).  
110. Lagging regions pose the stiffest test for the place-based approach to innovation 
and development. Although cohesion policy in the EU is a multi-scalar responsibility, in 
which supra-national, national and sub-national authorities need to work in concert to 
calibrate their efforts, no amount of external support can compensate for the quality of 
institutions at the regional level.  Institutional weakness – in terms of both governance and 
capacity – is one of the defining features of lagging regions, whether the latter are low 
growth regions or low income regions. Institutional quality in low growth regions is 
estimated to be just 63% of the EU average, while in low income regions it is just 57%. 
But it also varies significantly, from just 12% of the EU average in Campania (Italy) to 
26% above the EU average in Alentejo (Portugal). The absence of quality institutions 
stymies economic growth, compromises the provision of public services and denudes the 
region or the country of talent. For example, a survey of young migrants from Greece 
found that the main reason given for moving abroad was “the lack of meritocracy and 
corruption in society”, cited by 40% of respondents, even more than those who cited the 
economic crisis as the main reason for migrating abroad (World Bank, 2018: 108).  
111. These institutional deficits are often most pronounced at the sub-national level, 
especially in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania and Bulgaria, where lagging regions are 
believed to be ‘stuck in a low-administrative quality, low growth trap’ (EC, 2014: 168; 
Morgan, 2017a). A similar conclusion emerged from a highly influential analysis of 
quality of government and innovative performance, which found that high levels of 
corruption and low levels of policy-making capacity were the most important 
governmental qualities that constrained the efficacy of innovation policies – so much so 
that institutional reforms to reduce rent-seeking and combat corruption need to be 
considered as “de facto innovation policies for the regions in the periphery of Europe” 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2014: 22). The future of cohesion policy in and beyond 
the EU will increasingly revolve around efforts to enhance the quality of institutions by 
rendering governance more accountable, more effective and more experimental.   
5.2. City-regionalism: reconnecting cities and regions 
112. Burgeoning urbanisation has sparked two different but complementary debates 
about the role of cities in innovation and territorial development – namely city-
regionalism and new localism. City-regionalism is understood here to mean the manifold 
ways in which city governments are trying to re-connect with their regional hinterlands to 
form metropolitan governance structures. The quest for new forms of metropolitan 
governance can be framed narrowly or broadly. In the narrow sense, city-regionalism is 
driven by a purely economic desire to capitalise on the perceived benefits of 
agglomeration, and this is the dominant sense in which the term is used in most OECD 
countries today. In the broader sense, however, city-regionalism is fuelled by a desire to 
create more strategic spaces to design and deliver policies for sustainable development, 
and this is the ecological sense of the term. These two rationales – the economic and the 
ecological – are not mutually exclusive, not least because the city-regional process can be 
triggered by a narrow economic framing before evolving into a more capacious ecological 
framing as the costs and the limits of the former become more apparent (Morgan, 2014).  
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113. Whether the rationale for city-regionalism is economic or ecological, the political 
challenge remains the same – to fashion a metropolitan governance structure that affords 
greater institutional coherence to municipalities in the metro area – municipal bodies that 
may be rivals as well as neighbours. Overcoming administrative fragmentation in metro 
areas can deliver important benefits in terms of higher growth and more effective 
provision of public services, one reason why the number of metropolitan governance 
bodies has increased markedly since the 1990s. Indeed, more than two-thirds of OECD 
metro areas now have a metropolitan governance body and, of these, around 80% work on 
regional development, over 70% on transport and over 60% on spatial planning (OECD, 
2015). Securing institutional coherence is an enormously challenging task because of the 
growing complexity of multilevel polities and jurisdictional turf fights, as the following 
examples demonstrate. 
114. The multilevel polity in China poses particularly difficult challenges for city-
regionalism because of its institutional complexity and jurisdictional rivalry. Li and Wu’s 
(2017) research on city-region development in China’s Yangtze River Delta (YRD) 
provides a clear example of how relations between regional and national governments 
shape prospects for within-region cooperation and coordination. The YRD, like other 
Chinese regions, continues to feel the impact of the strongly hierarchical administrative 
system developed by the socialist regime, coupled with administrative decentralisation to 
local government (which itself consists of four levels). These administrative borders have 
proved particularly resistant to boundary-spanning initiatives, not least because it is at the 
local level that political reputations and career prospects are forged. As a consequence, 
bottom-up initiatives aimed at addressing regional needs find themselves in competition 
with the priorities of each constituent jurisdiction.  
115. As we saw earlier in section 3.1, while bottom-up collaboration is a challenge for 
city-regionalism in China, so too is top-down collaboration. In the YRD region, we might 
recall, the centrally-commissioned YRD Regional Plan provides for neither the structures 
nor the funding that would allow it to be implemented and local authorities continue to 
lack the powers to enact cross-boundary initiatives. This clearly limits the scope for new 
forms of experimentation at the city-regional level.  
116. In other cases the public sector is playing a pro-active role in fostering city-
regionalism. For example, in their assessment of urban living labs across Europe (Kronsell 
and Mukhtar-Landgren, 2018) identify three distinct roles for the public sector in 
experimental activities. As part of formal efforts to develop the Newcastle and Gateshead 
City Region, in the UK’s North-East region, Newcastle City Council has taken on the role 
of promoter. In return for City Deal funding, granted through an agreement with national 
government, the City Council has signed up to a series of commitments that have seen it 
take a renewed leadership role in the region – a role in which it “[uses] its authority and 
capacity to govern the [regional] collaboration” (p.996).  
117. But it has also recognised the value of working alongside other, non-state actors, 
and so has fostered a model in which it serves as a joint lead partner in many activities. 
Thus, in the development of Newcastle Science Central, a mixed-use development in the 
heart of the city that aspires to be a regional innovation hub, the City Council is working 
jointly with Newcastle University (www.newcastlesciencecentral.com). 
118. As relationships have grown, so this model has evolved, spawning Newcastle City 
Futures, a university-led partnership involving all of the region’s local governments and 
universities, together with other business, community and local government 
representatives (www.newcastlecityfutures.org). The process of identifying and 
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developing projects, all of which involve a local take on global challenges, has been an 
inherently collaborative affair. And while the City Council is a partner in the City Futures 
initiative, it need not be directly involved in all of the experimental projects beneath its 
umbrella. Thus it also serves a third role, that of facilitator, or enabler. 
119. The complex challenges of joint working across a city-region have been 
comprehensively addressed in Bradford & Bramwell’s (2014) volume on Canada, 
Governing Urban Economies. The authors identify three distinct forms of urban 
governance: institutionalised collaboratives, in which a clearly defined set of institutions 
defines goals, convenes actors and coordinates action; sector networks, which lack a 
coordinating infrastructure and thus see economic and social actors operating in 
independent networks; and project partnerships, in which collaboration occurs around 
time-limited projects, and participant organisations anticipate direct benefits. 
120. Nelles’ analysis of the Kitchener-Waterloo region (identified as an 
institutionalised collaborative case) highlights the importance of broad-based civic 
engagement to the sustainability of economic development initiatives; but it also raises the 
question of how groups representing civil society – many of which operate on a hyper-
local basis, attending to disparate interests or needs – can achieve the same voice in the 
decision-making process as associations with a purely economic focus. Where economic 
development associations have “transcended their originally narrow economic 
mandates”, as has happened in Kitchener-Waterloo, a more inclusive and coordinated 
form of regional governance has been possible. Nevertheless, given the membership of 
such associations, the risk remains that infrastructure development, while broadened to 
encompass education, the arts and culture, will predominantly serve the needs of the 
regional elites (Nelles, 2014).  
121. Meanwhile, in an example of a sector network region, Andrew and Doloreux 
identify the failure to connect the economic and social sectors in Ottawa as a contributing 
factor in “the general sense of dissatisfaction with the overall community and civic 
leadership” (Andrew and Doloreux, 2014:156). This highlights the challenge of uniting 
economic and social development goal because, as the authors note, the question of 
whether such objectives are compatible cannot simply be “normatively assumed”. 
Nevertheless, there are signs that coordination between them might usefully be improved. 
Notably, despite economic development goals in the Ottawa region containing “social 
dimensions”, action group membership has previously been limited to economic 
development interests, with “no explicit effort to bring in social partners” (Andrew and 
Doloreux, 2014: 148). But as the Kitchener-Waterloo case illustrates, these limitations can 
be addressed in such a way as to render the process of regional development more socially 
inclusive. Although city-regionalism tends to be a narrowly conceived economic process, 
in which local elites dominate the agenda, there is no inherent reason why the process 
cannot evolve into a more capacious agenda that embraces social and ecological concerns.  
5.3. New localism: cities as innovation spaces  
122. If city-regionalism focuses on the inter-municipal level of governance in the 
metropolitan region, new localism directs our attention to the interplay of city 
governments and their partners in the public, private and civic sectors. Although the 
concept of new localism has surfaced on occasions in the past (Morgan, 2007), it has been 
given a new prominence through the work of Bruce Katz at the Brookings Institution 
(Katz, 2017; Katz and Nowak, 2017). The central thesis is as bold as it is contentious 
because it claims that political power is undergoing a radical shift in the multilevel polity: 
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“Power is drifting downward from the nation-state to cities and metropolitan 
communities, horizontally from government to networks of public, private and civic 
actors, and globally along transnational circuits of capital, trade, and innovation […]. In 
sum, power increasingly belongs to the problem solvers. And these problem solvers now 
congregate disproportionately at the local level, in cities and metropolitan areas across 
the globe. New Localism embodies this new reality of power” (Katz and Nowak, 2017: 1-
2).  
123. It is no coincidence that this version of new localism was conceived and developed 
in the US, where the federal level is mired in such ideological gridlock that it is virtually 
impossible to secure bi-partisan support for the greatest issues of the day – issues like 
climate change, affordable healthcare, immigration and the regulation of campaign finance 
for example. So although the thesis allegedly applies to all countries, it is overwhelmingly 
addressed to an American audience because new localism is said to have emerged in its 
most dramatic form in the US as a result of “the exceptional level of partisanship and the 
consequent withdrawal of the federal and state governments as reliable partners” (Katz 
and Nowak, 2017: 12).  
124. The new localism thesis has been warmly embraced by prominent urbanists like 
Richard Florida, who has taken the argument much further by issuing “a declaration of 
urban independence”, calling for US cities to be liberated so that they can govern 
themselves, which is tantamount to an extreme form of hyper-localism: “Local 
communities and their residents have ceded power to corporations and the national 
government for far too long, and both have consistently failed to meet cities’ needs. It is 
time for cities to take back control and enable themselves to tackle their own opportunities 
and challenges from the ground up” (Florida, 2018).  
125. Strong localist sentiments are understandable when the federal level is so 
chronically dysfunctional, as it manifestly is in the US today, but critics claim that hyper-
localism is a problematical thesis on two counts: firstly, because it (wrongly) suggests that 
cities can solve their own problems and, secondly, because it (inadvertently) weakens 
efforts to reform the national state by refocusing attention on the sub-national level. As 
one critic argues:  
“Katz and Nowak marshal an impressive list of inspiring local innovations from 
cities, such as Indianapolis, Chattanooga, Oklahoma City, and St. Louis. Mayors 
and civic leaders in these places are generally pragmatic and entrepreneurial and 
are developing solutions that cut across partisan and ideological lines. Cities are, 
as the saying goes, the laboratories of democracy. But for the most part, they are 
the small-scale, bench-test laboratories for incubating ideas and showing that they 
can work at a municipal scale. Implementing these ideas at a national scale is 
essential to their success. The key lesson of policy experimentation is that while 
ideas can be tested and refined at the state or local level, they ultimately need to 
be national in scope. States experimented with minimum wage laws, 
unemployment insurance, and old age pensions, but none of these began to 
address our problems until extended nationwide in the New Deal” (Cortright, 
2018). 
126. This criticism is aimed not so much at new localism per se, but at the hyper-
localist demand for a unilateral declaration of urban independence which downplays the 
multiple inter-dependencies between the national and local levels. As Cortright rightly 
argues, many of the innovative city strategies celebrated by Katz and Nowak are directly 
dependent on the ability to tap federal funds. In the case of Pittsburgh, which is heralded 
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as an exemplar of local innovation, the reality is that Carnegie Mellon and the University 
of Pittsburgh receive more than $1 billion in federal research funding annually: “Cities 
looking to exploit an “eds and meds” strategy can’t do it without huge federal support in 
the form of research grants, student aid, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care 
Act. A federal government that defunds these programs – as seems likely because of the 
new tax law – will make it all but impossible for cities to innovate” (Cortright, 2018).  
127. The new localism rightly draws our attention to the potential for local 
experimentation at the urban level, especially where mayors and city governments have 
the wherewithal to craft new alliances with their stakeholders in the public, private and 
civil sectors. But tapping the full potential of cities requires not unilateral action within the 
city, but concerted action between the city and other governmental levels in the multilevel 
polity. Unfortunately, such inter-governmental collaboration is receding by the day in the 
toxic atmosphere of US politics, where the Trump administration has published plans to 
weaken regulations for vehicle fuel efficiency and carbon dioxide emissions, along with a 
proposal to strip California of its rights (under the 1970 Clean Air Act) to set its own 
vehicle emissions standards, a move that could trigger a new era of inter-jurisdictional 
conflict within the American multilevel polity (Crooks, 2018).   
5.4. Foundational economy: back to basics 
128. Finally, the foundational economy constitutes the most radical new concept in the 
place-based policy literature because it focuses not on the fashionable sectors of the 
knowledge economy, but the unfashionable sectors that are designed to keep us “safe, 
sound and civilised” – namely health, education, dignified eldercare, agrifood, energy and 
the like. The foundational economy includes the goods and services, which are the social 
and material infrastructure of civilized life because they provide the daily essentials for all 
households. These include material services through pipes and cables, networks and 
branches distributing water, electricity, gas, telecoms, banking services and food; and the 
providential services of primary and secondary education, health and care for children and 
adults as well as income maintenance. Foundational goods and services are purchased out 
of household income or provided free at point of use out of tax revenues.  The state often 
figures as direct provider or as funder; with public limited companies and outsourcing 
conglomerates increasingly delivering foundational services. The requirement for local 
distribution makes foundational activity immobile and much is protected from competition 
by the need for infrastructure investment, planning permission or government contracts. 
Foundational thinking rests on two key ideas which break with established ways of 
thinking and challenge taken for granted assumptions about economy, society and politics: 
 the well-being of citizens depends less on individual consumption and more on 
their social consumption of essential goods and services – from water and retail 
banking to schools and care homes.  Individual consumption depends on market 
income, while foundational consumption depends on social infrastructure and 
delivery systems of networks and branches which are neither created nor renewed 
automatically, even as incomes increase; 
 the distinctive, primary role of public policy should therefore be to secure the 
supply of basic services for all citizens, not a quantum of economic growth 
and jobs. If the aim is citizen well-being and flourishing, then politics at national 
and sub-national levels needs to be refocused on foundational consumption and 
securing universal minimum access and quality. When government is 
unresponsive, the impetus for change will have to come from engaging citizens 
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locally and regionally in actions which have the virtue that they break with the top 
down politics of “vote for us and we will do this for you” (FEC, 2018). 
129. The foundational economy (FE) perspective is part of a new wave of place-based 
conceptions that are primarily concerned to address and promote the intrinsically 
significant basic needs of people, especially the people who have been “left behind” by the 
forces of globalisation and technological change. For example, the FE perspective 
resonates strongly with the Inner Areas Strategy developed by Fabrizio Barca and 
colleagues in Italy, which focuses directly on people’s access to essential services, 
particularly health, education, and mobility (Barca, 2018). It also resonates with the 
Constitutional Political Economy approach in the US, which treats housing as a gateway 
to an array of essential services that are deemed to be vital to human flourishing. Among 
the policy experiments proposed in the CPE approach is more experimentation with 
“mandatory inclusionary zoning” at the local level to address the deep drivers of housing 
inequality and economic segregation (Rahman, 2018). The FE perspective is also closely 
aligned with the concept of universal basic service provision being developed by the UCL 
Institute of Global Prosperity, which sets out the concept in the following way:  
“Our research...demonstrates unequivocally that money spent on basic services – 
the most fundamental building blocks for life required by every citizen in the 21st 
century – dramatically reduces the cost of basic living for those on the lowest 
incomes. Basic services will reduce poverty because they will reduce the cost of a 
minimum living standard. Even if income levels remain static, it will make 
accessible a life that includes participation, builds belonging and common 
purpose and potentially strengthens the cohesion of society as a whole. Focusing 
on basic services, such as housing, food, communications and transport, is, we 
conclude, far more effective at driving down the cost of living than spending the 
same money on existing services, or on redistribution. In the UK, basic healthcare 
and education are already free for all, and while further investment in those 
services is desirable, it will not affect the cost of living for those at the bottom of 
our society. What we set out here is the blueprint for an enhanced but affordable 
social safety net. Following the Second World War, the British people through 
their elected government took a collective decision to institute the NHS –  basing 
healthcare access on need rather than the ability to pay. In the 21st century, we 
have an opportunity to extend this principle and ‘raise the floor’ of what all 
citizens can expect. By so doing, we can create a solid platform for improving the 
quality of people’s lives and the prosperity of future generations” (IGP, 2017: 6).   
130. Whatever their differences, the common denominator in these new place-based 
perspectives is an overriding concern for the intrinsically significant services that meet 
basic human needs and nourish human capabilities, services that are delivered as part of 
collective consumption rather than individuated through market income. However, like 
other needs-driven models, the FE perspective is politically challenging on three counts: 
(i) it is constrained by the fact that Treasuries are averse to raising tax income to provide 
revenue support for public services like education, health and social care; (ii) it pre-
supposes that governments are prepared to engage in radical re-regulation to raise the 
social ask on the private firms and public agencies that deliver foundational services; and 
(iii) it is predicated on the concept of active citizenship inasmuch as citizens are deemed to 
be willing and able to become co-producers of the essential services that they collectively 
consume. The latter appears to be one of the weaknesses of the Inner Areas Strategy in 
Italy because, while public participation has been higher than any previous government-
led local development process, “the strategy has often failed to adequately empower and 
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involve local citizens lacking the power and confidence to speak up in public debate 
and/or being de facto ostracized by the local elites” (Barca, 2018: 35). The challenge of 
active citizenship, or popular participation, in the place-based development process is 
addressed more fully in the following section because it returns us to one of the key issues 
that exercised the likes of John Dewey, namely the asymmetry between citizens and 
experts.  
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6.  Deliberative capacity and the democratic polity 
The rise of populism and nativism in many OECD countries has underlined the need for 
more democratic forms of governance and more inclusive forms of place-based 
development. Section 6 explores these issues through the prism of two important 
theoretical debates. The first is the postfunctionalist theory of multilevel governance, 
which maintains that governance arrangements at the sub-national level need to be 
understood as the interplay of functional logic and social identity rather than via 
functionalism alone. The second concerns the deepening democracy approach, which 
aims to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and 
influence policies that directly affect their lives, an approach that directly confronts the 
age-old dilemma of how citizens can relate to experts on equal terms.  
131. Although they might have a democratising effect on the political status quo, 
experimentalist governance processes are “not intrinsically democratic in themselves” 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 175). This is an important admission from the original advocates 
of experimental governance because, whatever its other merits, EG has attracted criticisms 
about lack of accountability and transparency on the one hand and for under-estimating 
the abiding significance of hierarchy on the other (Eckert and Borzel, 2012; Borzel, 2012; 
Fossum, 2012). These criticisms resonate with the ‘local trap’, namely the (false) idea 
“that local scale decision-making is inherently more likely to yield outcomes that are 
socially just or ecologically sustainable than decision-making at other scales” (Purcell 
and Brown 2005, 280). As Barbera et al. (2018) recently argued with respect to the local 
commons, citizenship and foundational economy, the concept of local scale should not be 
regarded as something with fixed properties, but rather as a group of strategies that are 
pursued by and for distinctive social groups and agendas. Accordingly, there is no reason 
to believe that local experimental governance per se will necessarily empower democracy 
and inclusion (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). 
132. The issues of accountability, transparency and hierarchy for place-based policy 
need to be given more prominence because the democratic credentials of EG should be 
empirically established rather than theoretically presumed. To this end it is worth 
considering two perspectives that raise these issues in different ways: the postfunctionalist 
theory of multilevel governance highlights the deliberative challenge for sub-national 
polities; and the deepening democracy thesis highlights the challenge of empowerment in 
the context of asymmetrical power relations.  
6.1. The sub-national polity: a postfunctionalist perspective  
133. One of the key arguments of the postfunctionalist theory is that governance 
involves at least two things: (i) multi-level governance arrangements serve a functional 
role in the efficient provision of public goods and (ii) governance arrangements also hold 
an intrinsic value as an expression of a community’s desire for self-rule (Hooghe and 
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Marks, 2016: 1). The importance of this dual understanding is twofold. Firstly, it 
emphasises how governance arrangements may vary not only because of differing policy 
preferences, but also because of polity preferences. In the latter case, variations in 
governance arrangements arise from self-rule preferences that reflect a region’s 
relationship to the central state and neighbouring regions. Secondly, Hooghe and Marks 
identify how this can create a complex interplay of governance arrangements within a 
jurisdiction that can be neither explained nor resolved with reference to functional 
efficiency alone, hence the need to understand the social as well as the functional logic of 
place-based governance arrangements. Although territorial loyalties were perceived as 
anachronistic by early modernisation theorists, who (wrongly) believed them to be the 
cultural hallmarks of economic backwardness, Hooghe and Marks have a much better 
understanding of the resilience of place-based attachments: “Territorial proximity is by no 
means necessary for sociality, but it certainly helps. Territorial community is perhaps the 
strongest form of solidarity there is. National states are the foremost example, but 
territorial communities within national states can also have a formidable capacity for 
collective action” (Hooghe and Marks, 2016:3). This argument has strong echoes of 
Dewey who went so far as to say: “The local is the ultimate universal, and as near an 
absolute as exists” (Dewey, 1927: 215).   
134. While the postfunctionalist approach to multi-level governance helps us to 
understand the multiscalar context in which local experimentation occurs, it has been 
subject to critique (see Eaton et al. 2018 for discussion). Perhaps the most pertinent 
criticism is its tendency to conflate authority and capacity, two concepts that are critical to 
the effective planning and implementation of any form of experimental governance. 
Hooghe and Marks privilege the notion of authority, which signifies the extent to which a 
regional government has the right to determine legislation, policy, and the collection and 
distribution of tax revenues. But authority lacks substance if it is not coupled with 
capacity, which refers to a government’s ability to discharge those functions. This 
distinction is of particular concern in lagging regions, where institutional thickness – the 
range of and interaction between the diverse organisations that contribute to a region’s 
development – is often lacking. In this instance, authority alone will not be sufficient to 
allow for the effective implementation of an experimental governance approach. 
135. In her pioneering work on capacity, identity and development, Prerna Singh finds 
that the effectiveness of a de-centralised approach depends on the extent to which citizens 
express a form of solidarity based on personal identification with the region in question. 
Uneven development between countries is more easily explained than uneven 
development within a country because, nominally at least, the latter shares many of the 
formal and informal institutions: so how do we explain the stark variations in social 
welfare between subnational units within the same country? The answer to this puzzle in 
India, Singh suggests, “lies in understanding how the shared solidarity that emerges from 
a collective identification can generate a politics of the common good” because 
“differences in the strength of affective attachment and cohesiveness of community can be 
a key driver of subnational differences in social policy and welfare. A shared 
identification fosters a communal spirit and solidaristic ethos and encourages a 
perception of not just individual but also collective interests”. Drawing on research 
comparing levels of social development in five Indian states, Singh rejects “a doctrinaire 
commitment to a policy of decentralization”, instead suggesting “that decentralization is 
likely to be more successful if the political administrative unit to which power is being 
devolved is a focus of citizens’ allegiance” (Singh, 2016).  
44 │   
  
  
136. The importance of this analysis lies in its emphasis on political and citizen 
capacity as central determinants of place-based development. When viewed as an outcome 
of such capacity, the striking social development record of the south-western state of 
Kerala – in comparison with other Indian states – is testament to what this devolved 
capacity can achieve (Singh, 2015; 2016). Moreover, the parallel with Amartya Sen’s 
(1999) seminal work on capabilities is striking, in that Sen’s work shifts the focus of 
development efforts from narrow economic considerations of maximising income and 
wealth, or utilitarian concerns with increasing overall satisfaction, to creating conditions 
that maximise individuals’ capabilities – that is their freedom to pursue the things they 
have reason to value. In this reading, capacity is both an important means of achieving 
desirable development ends as well as being an end in itself.  
137. To accentuate authority without reference to capacity perpetuates the debilitating 
tendency in territorial development studies to overplay policy design powers and 
underplay policy delivery capacity. But according to a recent analysis of state capacity, the 
key determinant of performance is not the design of policies, programmes and projects, 
but the capability for implementation. Many states, it was found, have highly skewed 
institutional capabilities: the capability to propose policies, programmes and projects but 
“not the capability to implement them” (Andrews et al, 2017: 12). The argument here runs 
counter to the conventional territorial policy paradigm, which involves identifying and 
importing “good governance” and “best practice” from elsewhere, and proposes instead an 
approach which involves “solving problems” locally and not “importing solutions” from 
afar, because success builds capacity not vice versa.  
6.2. Deepening democracy: the EDD perspective 
138. Solving problems locally and deepening democracy are inextricably linked in 
place-based development strategies that seek to empower and engage citizens and one of 
the most compelling examples is the Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) 
perspective that explored real-world experiments in the redesign of democratic 
institutions. The projects explored under the EDD umbrella embraced a wide range of 
local development issues – including neighbourhood governance councils, habitat 
conservation planning schemes and participatory budgeting that afforded citizens some 
say over city budgets. Although the details of these projects are very different, “they all 
aspire to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and 
influence policies that directly affect their lives. From their common features, we call this 
reform family Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD). They have the potential to be 
radically democratic in their reliance on the participation and capacities of ordinary 
people, deliberative because they institute reason-based decision making, and empowered 
since they attempt to tie action to discussion” (Fung and Wright, 2001: 7).    
139. One of the great merits of this perspective, from a policy and practice standpoint, 
is that it transfers the deliberative democracy debate from the realm of abstract principles 
(where it concerns procedural and substantive debates about values, reason and justice, 
etc) to the empirical realm of organizations, practices, and place-based problems.  The 
EDD perspective offers three general principles and three institutional design principles to 
illustrate the scope for place-based deliberative capacity building. The general principles 
are: (i) a focus on specific, tangible problems, (ii) involvement of ordinary people affected 
by these problems and officials close to them, and (iii) the deliberative development of 
solutions to these problems. Three institutional design features help to reinforce these 
general principles: (i) the devolution of public decision authority to empowered local 
units; (ii) the creation of formal linkages of responsibility, resource distribution, and 
  │ 45 
 
  
  
communication that connect these units to each other and to more centralized authorities; 
and (iii) the use and generation of new state institutions to support and guide these de-
centred problem solving efforts rather than leaving them as informal or voluntary affairs 
(Fung and Wright, 2001: 17).   
140. The most important objective of deliberative democratic experiments, according to 
EDD advocates, is to advance public ends more effectively than alternative governance 
models such as command and control hierarchies and market-based solutions. But how 
and why should this be the case? The main reason, it is claimed, is the greater problem-
solving capacity of the EDD approach because: (i) these experiments convene and 
empower individuals close to the points of action who possess intimate knowledge about 
relevant situations; (ii) in many problem contexts, these individuals, whether they are 
citizens or officials at the street level, may also know how best to improve the situation; 
(iii) the deliberative process that regulates these groups’ decision making is likely to 
generate superior solutions than hierarchical or less reflective aggregation procedures 
(such as voting) because all participants have opportunities to offer useful information and 
to consider alternative solutions more deeply; (iv) these experiments shorten the feedback 
loop—the distance and time between decisions, action, effect, observation, and 
reconsideration—in public action and so create a nimble style of collective action that can 
quickly recognize and respond to erroneous or ineffective strategies (Fung and Wright, 
2001: 26). Whatever the practical merits of these arguments, the efficacy of the EDD 
problem-solving approach is an empirical rather than a theoretical question.  
141. What are the main barriers to this problem-solving approach? A number of 
potential barriers have been identified, not least by EDD advocates themselves, who say: 
“Perhaps the most serious potential weakness of these experiments is that they may pay 
insufficient attention to the fact that participants in these processes usually face each 
other from unequal positions of power. These inequalities can stem from material 
differences and the class backgrounds of participants, from the knowledge and 
information gulfs that separate experts from laypersons, or from personal capacities for 
deliberation and persuasion associated with educational and occupational advantages” 
(Fung and Wright, 2001: 33). 
142. Asymmetries of power and knowledge mean that citizens rarely if ever play on a 
level playing field when they engage in public deliberative forums. As we have seen, this 
was the problem that exercised Dewey in the 1920s; it was one of the problems that 
impaired the Inner Areas Strategy in Italy; and it is a problem that needs to be addressed 
with more imagination and more urgency if citizens are to be genuinely involved in the 
design and delivery of policies that affect the character of development and the quality of 
public services in their localities and regions. Formal political institutions – such as 
national or subnational parliaments – have been nominally responsible for development 
matters and public service provision, but this is no longer enough because “the liberal 
democratic image of politics as an activity proceeding exclusively through the national 
parliament is, in contemporary times, questionable” (Gaynor, 2009: 306). To dismiss 
participatory methods as undermining a system of equal representation is therefore to set 
up a false comparison. Drawing from democratic experiments in the global north and the 
global south, Gaynor identifies the importance of structuring communication within the 
participatory process to ensure a more democratic process and outcome. Specifically, 
“democracy can be deepened when governance deliberations and negotiations are 
conducted under conditions of vibrant public debate and genuine perspective-based 
representation and when the communicative and discursive norms are widened to allow 
for such representation” (Gaynor, 2009: 305). The barriers to this approach include (i) 
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norms that restrict the discussion of issues deemed important by one or more of the 
participants, or that limit citizens to input on predetermined topics; (ii) narrow forms of 
communication that favour an elite and so restrict wider participation; and (iii) a lack of 
transparency that prevents public debate on both the deliberative process and the 
subsequent actions.  
143. To overcome these barriers we may have to look backwards to help us move 
forwards by reclaiming and updating some of the ideas that motivated the likes of 
Jefferson and Dewey, who were both attracted to the idea of “ward republics”, the locally-
embedded institutions of a participatory democracy. Some of the proposals for re-
inventing democracy in America are influenced by these earlier ideas, like the 
“deliberative panels” and “civic juries” that fashion political institutions that foster rather 
than frustrate active citizenship (Fishkin, 1991; Leib, 2004). As place-based institutions, 
however, the concept of the ward republic is much more problematical today, not least 
because a purely territorial conception of place has been jettisoned by relational 
geographers on the grounds that it is ontologically untenable in a multiscalar world where 
globalisation and digitalisation have jointly spawned a more complex “global sense of 
place” (Massey; 2005; Allen and Cochrane, 2007).  
144. Modern pragmatists in the Deweyian tradition also freely acknowledge that 
learning across localities is as important as learning within them because: “the 
fundamental problem today seems not how to preserve or foster creation of natural 
communities, but how to encourage sufficient explication of tacit knowledge to make 
exchange and learning among “strangers” possible without undermining the conditions 
that foster informal dealings and reciprocity” (Sabel, 2012: 42). 
145. Like all models of governance then, the experimentalist governance model 
continues to struggle with the trilemma of how to calibrate the contending claims of 
democracy, deliberation and devolution, all of which have a legitimate part to play in 
socially inclusive place-based development strategies. 
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7.  Conclusions and key questions  
146. Experimentalist governance, in the strict sense of the term used by Sabel and 
Zeitlin, is an intellectually compelling but politically challenging model. At the heart of 
this particular model is the claim that hierarchical management and principal-agent 
governance have been compromised by the advent of strategic uncertainty. My discussion 
focused on two key propositions of the model: (a) the public sector’s commitment to and 
its capacity for learning-by-monitoring and (b) the degree of autonomy and discretion 
afforded to local units in the multilevel polity and the alleged demise of hierarchy. These 
are big asks in lagging regions, where the institutional capacity is simply not up to the 
challenge and this constitutes one of the main issues to be discussed at the OECD seminar 
in December.  
147. Taking experimental governance in the looser sense of the term, experimentalism 
is clearly an idea whose time has come because institutional experiments are proliferating 
at every level of the multilevel polity, especially with respect to place-based development 
policies. 
 
148. With respect to place-based policy in the EU, we saw that there were two major 
problems with the experimentalist governance model: the upper tier (the European 
Commission) has neither the powers nor the requisite skill set to fulfil the roles envisaged 
by the Barca Report; while the lower tier (the regions) enjoys very limited autonomy 
because regional actors are stymied by the excessive regulations of an audit regime that 
extols compliance over innovation. If the proposed Multiannual Financial Framework 
2021-2027 is accepted, however, the problem of excessive regulation will be reduced 
because there will be a leaner and more agile budget and less red tape for beneficiaries.   
149. State-sponsored experimentalism was addressed in two radically different national 
contexts. The authoritarian state context is instructive because it shows – in China for 
example – that local experiments can thrive under the most elaborate hierarchies if there 
are well established mechanisms and procedures for nurturing and scaling them. But in 
other top-down contexts  – like Russia for example – the “rules of the game” offer few 
incentives to experiment with novelty. 
150. Liberal democracies, as we might expect, are the most active in promoting 
experimentalist initiatives and the three examples examined in the paper – the new 
industrial policy paradigm, the entrepreneurial state thesis and the public sector innovation 
lab – all serve to underscore the growing importance attached to public sector innovation 
in the broadest sense of the term. Although these experiments are bedevilled by the 
challenge of how to deal with failure, feedback and learning, an even greater challenge is 
how to resolve the tension between austerity and sustainability. That is to say, how to 
manage the tension between the evisceration and diminution of the public sector through 
austerity-driven budget cuts on the one hand and, on the other, the need for a smart public 
sector that has the competence and confidence to play a more innovative role in the sectors 
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– like education, heath, dignified eldercare, energy, transport, food security, etc. – that lie 
at the heart of our societal challenges.   
151. With respect to the sub-national worlds of experimentalism, I sought to contrast 
conventional theories of place-based development – regional innovation systems, city-
regionalism and new localism – with new and more radical theories, such as the 
foundational economy. While the former tend to focus on the conventional metrics of 
economic development, on instrumentally significant goals so to speak, the latter focuses 
on intrinsically significant goals in the sense that they aim to meet human needs directly 
by furnishing the mundane goods and services that constitute the “infrastructure of 
everyday life”. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the foundational economy perspective is 
how to secure the political settlements that are necessary to fund providential services like 
education, health and social care.  
152. Finally, the paper addressed aspects of our current political conundrum. With 
polarised politics and nativist sentiment on the rise in many OECD countries, the 
fundamental values of the democratic polity are being questioned like no time since the 
1930s. To the extent that territorial inequalities are implicated in this process, and there is 
a good deal of evidence to suggest that they are (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018), the role of place-
based policy assumes that much more significance. As regards the future of place-based 
policy, I suggested that, to be more effective, such policy will need to meet two necessary 
conditions: (a) that sub-national institutions are invested with more autonomy to design 
and implement policies that are better attuned to their local circumstances, albeit with the 
help of the multi-level polity and (b) that the citizens of “left behind” places are 
empowered to play a more active role in the transformation of their localities through 
more deliberative forms of democratic engagement. Asymmetries of power and 
knowledge are the main barriers to such strategies today, just as they were in John 
Dewey’s day, when “democratic realists” suggested it was naive to think that more 
egalitarian worlds were possible.    
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